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Abstract
This Working Paper aims to present and discuss recent evidence on the effect of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) on wages, working conditions and industrial relations. It presents a. an overview of the available 
literature on the effects of FDI on wages, particularly in developed countries; b. the outcomes of own re-
search comparing wages, working conditions and workplace industrial relations in Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs) versus non-MNEs or domestic ﬁ  rms. These outcomes include seven EU member states: Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and ﬁ  ve industries: metal 
and electronics manufacturing; retail; ﬁ  nance and call centres; information and communication technology 
(ICT), and transport and telecom. The data stem from the continuous WageIndicator web-survey, combined 
with company data from the AIAS MNE Database. The analysis took place in the framework of the so-
called WIBAR-2 project, funded by the European Commission under the Industrial Relations and Social 
Dialogue Program (VS/2007/0534, December 2007-November 2008). The project was led by the AIAS, 
with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC); the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF); 
Ruskin College (Oxford); WSI im Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (Düsseldorf), and the WageIndicator Foundation 
as partners.
Both from others’ and our own evidence, the picture emerged that the wage advantages emanating 
from working in an MNE in Northwestern Europe recently have become rather small, with our evidence 
for Germany, where we found considerable MNE wage premia, as the exception. In the majority of Polish 
and Spanish subsidiaries of MNEs these premia were still considerable. By contrast, in the retail trade and 
in transport and telecom MNEs seemed to exert outright wage pressure in some countries. Besides pay, 
workers mostly perceived advantages in working in an MNE where these were to be expected, in training 
and internal promotion, but also –rather unexpectedly-- in workplace industrial relations. Here, on all three 
yardsticks used (union density, collective bargaining coverage and the incidence of workplace employee 
representation) MNEs scored higher than domestic ﬁ  rms. MNEs scored less favourably on overtime com-
pensation, working hours, and experienced and expected reorganisations. Where MNE wage premia show 
up, they have much in common with ‘efﬁ  ciency wages’, meant to buy higher productivity and extra commit-
ment from (skilled) workers. 
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1.  The wage effects of Foreign Direct 
Investment
1.1.   Introduction
In the globalizing world the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have increasingly pervaded 
the economies of many countries. In the 1980s and 1990s foreign direct investment (FDI)1, the main mech-
anism for the international expansion for MNEs,2 showed unequalled growth with yearly rates of 20-40%. 
This came to an end in the new millennium when a highly unstable growth pattern began to emerge. In 
2001, inﬂ  uenced by the economic downturn in the US, the upward trend in FDI turned abruptly into a fall 
of over 40%. Then, after three ailing years, FDI growth rebounded strongly between 2005-2007, with yearly 
increases of between 33 and 47% (UNCTAD, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2008).3 However, already in the course of 
2007 unmistakable signs of a slow-down appeared, and in 2010 the UNCTAD World Investment Report 
reported that worldwide FDI inﬂ  ows had fallen progressively, by 16% in 2008 and 37% in 2009. The report 
concluded that the economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis has signiﬁ  cantly affected the operations of MNEs abroad 
in 2008-2009, but that the decline of sales and value-added of their foreign afﬁ  liates was less than the de-
cline of world economic activity. As a result, in 2009 the share of foreign afﬁ  liates’ value-added reached an 
historic high of 11% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP); in 1990 this share was almost 7%, in 
2000 9.5%. Thus, after a hesitation in 2008 the crisis has not halted the growing internationalization of pro-
duction (UNCTAD, 2009, 18-19; UNCTAD, 2010, xviii, 16). It should be added that the fall in FDI ﬂ  ows in 
/ from the European Union (EU) during the crisis was initially even sharper than the worldwide decrease, 
with in 2008 a drop of 34% for outﬂ  ows and 52% for inﬂ  ows; in 2009, EU investments abroad continued to 
decline by 24% (Goncalves and Karkkainen, 2010). Notwithstanding these more recent adverse conditions 
1 The  deﬁ  nition of FDI of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), setting the world stand-
ard, is: “(….) a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) with the objective 
of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of 
the direct investor (……) The lasting interest is evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of 
the direct investment enterprise.” Cf. OECD, 2008, 10. See also UNCTAD, 2006, 293.
2  MNEs are not the only vehicles for FDI; individuals, governments, regional and international organizations as well as special 
funds are also engaged in FDI. In 2009, FDI by special funds (private equity funds, as well as sovereign wealth funds set up by 
or on behalf of sovereign states) reached over 10% of global FDI ﬂ  ows, up from less than 7% in 2000 but down from 22% 
in the peak year of 2007 (UNCTAD, 2010, 13). Moreover, FDI stocks and inward FDI ﬂ  ows largely overstate the productive 
activities of MNE afﬁ  liates in countries functioning as tax havens. In contrast, MNE afﬁ  liates may ﬁ  nance activities by raising 
external funds locally, in particular in host countries with mature stock and bond markets; where this is the case, FDI stocks 
underestimate actual MNE afﬁ  liate activity (Beugelsdijk et al, 2010).
3  FDI growth has been measured in current prices.Page ● 10
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the likelihood remains that inward and outward FDI ﬂ  ows will have had a substantial impact on wages and 
working conditions in the EU member states.
This chapter aims to present and discuss the available literature on the effects of FDI on wages, particu-
larly in highly developed countries. The WIBAR-2 project aimed at comparing wages in MNE subsidiaries 
and non-MNE (domestic) ﬁ  rms in seven of these countries: Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. As will be reported in Chapter 3, the WIBAR-2 project also in-
cluded research concerning the effects of FDI on various dimensions of working conditions, in particular 
on working hours, and on workplace industrial relations. Yet, from an analytical viewpoint we focus this 
Chapter on FDI and wages. After she reviewed existing literature, Karolina Ekholm (2004, 83) concluded 
that “whether (the multinationals) offer better or worse working conditions is an issue that has not been 
explored in a systematic way”. More recently, OECD staff conﬁ  rmed that still “very little is known about 
the impact of foreign ownership on non-wage working conditions” (OECD / ILO, 2008, 14), and an ILO 
study asserted that very few papers have analysed the impact of FDI on receiving countries in terms of 
employment levels and job quality (Bottini et al, 2007, 18). As it is rather impossible to confront our ﬁ  ndings 
on (non-wage) working conditions and industrial relations with an already existing body of knowledge, it 
makes sense to focus on wages here.
We start this chapter by outlining the various forms, motives and approaches of the expansion of 
MNEs, as these may well have differing effects on the labour market position and wages of various catego-
ries of workers. Second, we summarize the recent literature on wage differentials between MNE subsidiaries 
and domestic ﬁ  rms. We relate that to the debate on the causality of differences between MNEs and other 
ﬁ  rms in terms of productivity; technology; scale of activities, and human capital. We add factors observable 
in national industrial relations as further potential causes.
1.2.  Expansion of MNEs
The creation of an international supply chain for agricultural products, largely by the Dutch VOC and 
the British East India Company in the 1700s and subsequent efforts by Dutch and English mining entrepre-
neurs in the Indies and India in the early 19th century were early examples of what we now term as Foreign 
Direct Investment. Following on from this US manufacturers began to move to foreign countries as soon as 
they had an adequate departmental structure in place (Chandler, 1962, 20-41). In 1867, for example, Singer’s 
Glasgow sewing machine factory marked that company’s ﬁ  rst market-seeking investment abroad (Wilkins, Page ● 11
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1970, 64-5). Their large size and oligopolistic positions gave US ﬁ  rms incentives to invest directly abroad in 
customers, suppliers and competitors, and to develop into genuine MNEs. The ﬁ  rst wave of US-based FDI 
occurred around 1900, followed by a second wave during the 1920s (Van den Berghe, 2003).
The renewed rush in FDI in the 1950s and 1960s was initiated by US enterprises, based on their size and 
new multinational structures but it turned into a race with European and Japanese competitors as new forms 
and motives for FDI emerged (Hymer, 1975). For instance from the 1960s onwards, the advance of infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) and the continuous decrease of transport costs enabled a 
growing number of MNEs systematically to develop into efﬁ  ciency seekers. They fragmented (unbundled) 
their economic activities, relocating labour-intensive processes to countries with pools of cheap labour. As 
the early case of the US semiconductor industry showed, ‘worldwide sourcing’, exploiting labour cost dif-
ferentials was an important driver (Helleiner, 1973; Fröbel et al, 1977; Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). Led by 
US-based MNEs in electronics and apparel, where low labour costs play a signiﬁ  cant role in location deci-
sions, in the 1990s a growing share of the world’s FDI stock was located in low wage countries:4 6% in 1990, 
12% in 1999 (Burke and Epstein, 2001, 16-21). The entry of China, India and the former Soviet (CIS) coun-
tries to the global capitalist system has led to what Richard Freeman (2005) has dubbed “the doubling of 
the global workforce”, allowing MNEs access to huge pools of low wage but productive and skilled labour 
and increasing the proﬁ  tability of their relocation decisions (Cf. Bottini et al, 2007). In 2008-2009, China was 
the second largest recipient (after the US) of FDI inﬂ  ows, accounting for 8% of foreign new (‘greenﬁ  eld’) 
investments in the world; India and South-East Europe as well as the CIS countries each attracted 6% of 
these investments (UNCTAD, 2010, 4). With the worldwide decrease in FDI in 2007-2009, initially the num-
ber of workers directly employed in the foreign afﬁ  liates of MNEs fell by an estimated two to three million, 
but then increased to about 80 million in 2009 (1990: 24 million, 2005: 58 million -- UNCTAD, 2009, T. I.6; 
2010, T. I.5), accounting for about 2.5% of the global workforce.5
By 2009, with 16 million workers the largest number estimated to be employed in foreign afﬁ  liates by 
country was in China (UNCTAD, 2010, 16-17). Also, ﬁ  rms headquartered in China (including HongKong), 
India, Brazil and the Russian Federation –the four countries coined BRIC by the chief economist of Gold-
man Sachs -- have become major international players and outward investors. Though the FDI outﬂ  ows 
4 Deﬁ  ned as having average wages in the formal sector less than 25% of the average US manufacturing wage (Burke and Ep-
stein, 2001). 
5  UNCTAD’s suggestion that 80 million is equal to 4% of the global workforce (2010, 17), seems to seriously underestimate 
the latter’s size. Based on ILO Laborsta data, the global workforce can be estimated at 3.2 billion. Freeman’s statement implied 
some exaggeration, as the Laborsta data indicates that the economically active population of China and India by 2009 jointly 
was about 1,270 million, or 40% of the world total.Page ● 12
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from the developing and transition countries remained well below their share of FDI inﬂ  ows, China and 
the Russian Federation are already among the top 10 FDI home countries in the world (UNCTAD, 2010, 
6-7). For Western MNEs, based in large as well as smaller countries, attaining lower labour costs remains 
a major driver for FDI. For instance, in 2001-2006 six of ten Dutch and Danish ﬁ  rms involved in ‘inter-
national sourcing’ surveyed mentioned ‘savings on labour costs’ as a very important motive (Van Gessel-
Dabekaussen, 2008).  
This foreign relocation of manufacturing activities can be called material offshoring, whereas service 
or ‘immaterial’ offshoring relates to the foreign relocation of service tasks, for instance, ﬁ  nancial and call 
centre operations. The relationship between offshoring and the activities abroad of MNEs can take many 
forms. In addition to occuring through afﬁ  liates of MNEs, offshoring can also take place through arm’s 
length contracts with foreign suppliers, today usually referred to as international outsourcing (Helpman, 
2006). Offshoring to developed countries is mainly done through afﬁ  liates, whereas arm’s length contracts 
are more widely applied for standard products from developing countries (Gerefﬁ   et al, 2005; OECD, 2007). 
In the 1980s contractual relations with suppliers in low-wage countries emerged as the main form of in-
ternationalization in the buyer-driven chains that cater for the needs of large retailers and clothing and 
sportswear manufacturers (Gerefﬁ  , 1994). The catalyst in the development of such global supply chains has 
been the rise of the US-based retail giant Wal-Mart, currently the world’s largest proﬁ  t-making company and 
employer. Wal-Mart has arguably been called “the template business standard for a new stage in the history 
of world capitalism”, and has been labelled as the successor of US Steel, General Motors, IBM and Micro-
soft who were regarded as templates of previous stages (Lichtenstein, 2006, 4). The keystone in Wal-Mart’s 
strategy is the ability to exert hard control over factor inputs, including control over US and international 
supply chains (Christopherson, 2007). Currently global buyers (retailers, marketers, traders) do exert a high 
degree of control over spatially dispersed production also when they do not own that production. Various 
types of supplier relationship can be denominated in global value chains, and indeed not all suppliers are 
locked in dependent or ‘captive’ relations (Cf. Gerefﬁ   et al, 2005). Yet, speciﬁ  c knowledge and skills remain 
crucial in the governance of global value chains. And based on their control over such knowledge and skills 
MNE’s sourcing strategies related to the global (re)location of production and servicing have furthered 
asymmetrical power relations, favouring lead or core ﬁ  rms over dependent ﬁ  rms, lead ﬁ  rms over workers, 
and countries home to lead ﬁ  rms over other countries, with risks externalized to parties lower in the chain 
hierarchies (Palpacuer, 2008; Gibbon et al, 2008). Page ● 13
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Finally and most recently, skill-seeking –sometimes called technology- or efﬁ  ciency-seeking-- emerged 
as a new motive for FDI. In the 1990s this began to occur when ﬁ  rms from high-income European coun-
tries, notably German MNEs, tended to be attracted by Central and East European Countries (CEECs) with 
relatively abundant supplies of skilled labour.6 By contrast, Swedish MNEs have hardly shown such skill 
seeking behaviour (Becker et al, 2005, 721). Whilst labour market shortages at home may have contributed 
substantially to their search (Cf. Buch and Lipponer, 2005), a more political-economic interpretation may 
well be added here too, namely, the exertion of managerial pressure on home labour costs by confronting 
high-skilled workers and their representatives with the threat of ‘exit options’, in particular concerning relo-
cation (Cf. Hoffmann, 2006). A number of economists has modelled that the larger the ﬁ  rm’s (re)location 
options, the lower workers’ wages and the higher the ﬁ  rm’s levels of proﬁ  t –in developing as well as devel-
oped countries (Bughin and Vanini, 1995; Zhao, 1998). The fragmentation of production processes and the 
decreasing costs of offshoring, jointly with the continuous control of MNEs over value chains would affect 
factor prices, implying relatively lower wages in the home countries at notably low or medium job levels -- 
unless other factors counteract their inﬂ  uence (Cf. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). One such factor 
may be the comparatively low employment share of the low- and medium-skilled in the traded or exposed 
sectors; they may be concentrated in sectors depending on public or local demand. Concerning the US there 
is evidence for such a distribution (Jensen and Kletzer, 2007). Yet, as far as we could trace for most Western 
European countries, where this may be the case a fortiori, evidence is lacking (Cf. Schank et al, 2007). 
The potential for production and servicing mobility of capital matters for industrial relations. The in-
ternational fragmentation of production has been closely related to the undermining of Taylorist / Fordist 
mass production, the rise of new forms of work organisation and the ﬂ  exibilisation of labour markets and 
technologies, trends all pushing towards the fragmentation of the workforce in developed countries. Human 
Resource Management (HRM) practices and tools have played active roles in furthering these developments, 
and have impacted considerably on the employment relationship and on worker representation, on balance 
adding up to the ‘fracturing of collectivism’ (Cf. Gallie et al, 1998; Hyman, 2007). Notably since the 1980s, 
the exposure of a growing number of industries to the forces of the world market, growing FDI and in-
ternational outsourcing may well have fuelled feelings of job insecurity among the workforce. Interestingly, 
combining industry- and person-level data for the UK between 1991 and 1999, Scheve and Slaughter (2004) 
found compelling conﬁ  rmation for the assumption that exposure to FDI generates economic insecurity: 
6  Though other investment motives, like ﬁ  nancial incentives by national or local authorities and proximity to new markets and 
suppliers, often also played a role. See for example company case studies in European Foundation, 2009a.Page ● 14
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holding other factors constant, workers employed in industries exposed to FDI reported less satisfaction. 
For Germany Frijters and Geishecker (2008), also combining industry- and person-level data (for 1995-
2004) but focusing on international outsourcing rather than FDI, noticed a sharp decrease starting in 2001 
in the share of respondents that reported to be not concerned about their job security. The outcomes by 
skill groups converged, but the higher-skilled respondents continuously showed more fears for job loss; as 
the authors suggest, they may be more worried as they have more to lose in terms of ﬁ  rm- or industry-
speciﬁ  c human capital. 
The rise of ‘Chindia’ may have already induced unions and workers to make concessions in order to 
retain jobs, but the larger mobility of capital has obviously pushed the management of MNEs in developed 
countries to intensify the use of ‘whipsawing’, in which management plays off plants against each other in 
order to extract concessions from labour, and of ‘exit threats’. The metals industry, and in particular car 
manufacturing as one of the most advanced and internationalized industries, provides ample examples. For 
instance, an University of Amsterdam dissertation concluded that in large German metal ﬁ  rms “exit threats 
are an extremely pervasive part of employer strategy”, with which in particular works councils have been 
confronted (Raess, 2006, 62; see also Raess and Burgoon, 2006, and Meardi et al, 2009a). After the 1990s and 
early 2000s witnessed a series of notorious plant closures by MNEs and related disputes (Muller-Camen et 
al, 2001), in the years to follow such threats of relocation have received great prominence in the media and 
have served to strengthen negative public perceptions towards FDI (Galgóczi et al, 2007, 23). Concerning 
collective bargaining outcomes, the effects may vary but ‘concession bargaining’ can be clearly discerned: 
see section 1.5.
It has to be said that in the current global crisis, the state of FDI is inextricably bound up in the mas-
sive capital movements fuelled by the ‘ﬁ  nancialisation’ and ‘securitisation’ of the economy. At the same 
time, it has also been inﬂ  uenced by the growing dominance of shareholder value approaches to corporate 
governance and by the pure greed and macho behaviour of many corporate ‘players’ who have exploited 
the lack of effective regulation at an appropriate (global, European) level (cf. Watt, 2008, 6-10). Since mid-
September 2008, the implications in terms of job insecurity and unemployment of all of these elements 
have gradually been revealed. Already, in the years preceding the crisis the internationalization of trade and 
production, including transferring international management practices, had given rise to escalating levels of 
market uncertainty and to the permanent reorientation and reorganisation of companies in accordance with 
short-term goals. Evaluating wage developments related to FDI although important in its own right has also 
to be seen as part of this wider story.Page ● 15
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1.3.  FDI in home countries
We start this section discussing the literature on the wage effects of outward FDI in MNE home coun-
tries. Offshoring through FDI can be understood as ‘vertical’ FDI, whereas ‘horizontal’ FDI means the 
replication abroad of the same activities performed domestically with the aim of gaining advantage in the 
(ﬁ  nal) markets of host or neighbouring countries. Material and servicing offshoring as well as horizontal 
and vertical offshoring respectively are likely to differ in their labour market impact i.e. wage effects (Crinò, 
2007, 2-4). Notably the vertical variant of material offshoring may lead to a fall in demand for low- or 
medium-skilled workers in home countries. Studies of developments in manufacturing industries in the 
1980s and 1990s, for the US, Japan, Hong Kong and Mexico (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001), for the US, the 
UK, Italy and Sweden (Anderton et al, 2002), for the UK (Grifﬁ  th, 1999; Hijzen et al, 2003, 2005), Sweden 
(Ekholm and Hakkala, 2005), and Germany (Falk and Koebel, 2002; Geishecker and Görg, 2004), conﬁ  rm 
that in these countries material offshoring enlarged the so-called skill premium and was instrumental in 
increasing wage inequality, in particular in the 1990s. Most studies found that the skill-biased effect of FDI 
mainly worked through lowering the relative wages of low- and medium-skilled workers with almost no ef-
fect on the wages of the high-skilled (Anderton et al, 2002; Hijzen et al, 2003; Geishecker and Görg, 2004; 
Ekholm and Hakkala, 2005), while a few (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001) emphasized the effects favouring the 
high-skilled.
Until recently most studies did not present much evidence to support the fear that MNEs have been 
substituting foreign for domestic jobs, particularly if it concerned FDI in low-wage countries. In part this 
was because of the classical vertical international division of labour (Cf. Fröbel et al, 1977), that activities 
in these countries seemed complementary to the activities performed in the home country (Zhang and 
Markusen, 1999; Braconier and Ekholm, 2000; Bruno and Falzoni, 2003). For the US, older studies on 
home country effects, like those of Brainard and Riker (1997) and Feenstra and Hanson (2001), concluded 
to limited substitution effects on employment and hardly traceable wage effects in the short run, and in the 
long run even found a positive impact of offshoring on the real value-added per low-skilled worker. Some 
more recent empirical research focusing on manufacturing arrived at similar conclusions (Desai et al, 2005), 
though it has also been argued that the long-term impact on the wages of low-skilled may be more negative 
(Ekholm and Ulltveit-Moe, 2007). There have been a few efforts to more systematically isolate the wage 
and employment effects of various FDI types. For example, Harrison and MacMillan (2008, 27-8) con-
cluded that American ‘vertical’ FDI abroad had stimulated job growth at home, though horizontal expan-Page ● 16
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sion abroad led to modestly lower employment in the US. They stated that falling prices and labour-saving 
technological change were more important factors. Others have pointed to the declining trade balances in 
most US manufacturing sectors, with imports booming. Yet, for various reasons trade ﬁ  gures as such can 
be misleading. For example, imports may displace domestic products that themselves contain imported 
intermediate goods. Indeed, for considerable periods of time during the 2000s the failure of domestic US 
demand growth to match productivity growth explained the large losses in manufacturing employment to 
a much larger extent than the deteriorating trade balance, which in particular was related to a fall of the US 
share in world trade (Cf. Baily and Lawrence, 2004; Krugman, 2008; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2010).
A new wave of studies on the home country effects of US service offshoring suggests that such activity 
has neither caused signiﬁ  cant job insecurity nor wage losses for high-skilled US white-collar workers. Actu-
ally there seems to be quite some proof that service offshoring is skill-biased, working out negatively for 
relatively low-skilled American white-collar workers (Hanson et al, 2005; Amiti and Wei, 2005; Crinò, 2006; 
Liu and Treﬂ  er, 2008; Crinò, 2010). These outcomes are in line with the conﬁ  dence placed in American 
institutions and their innovative potential when confronted by the ‘Asian tigers’. For example, the famous 
journalist, Thomas Friedman pointed at the “unique innovation-generating machines” of the US, referring 
to the country’s universities, public and private research labs, and retailers, and to the US possessing “the 
best-regulated and most efﬁ  cient capital markets in the world” (Friedman, 2004, 245). Obviously continu-
ous innovation and improved education, based on the country’s existing institutions and policies, would be 
effective. Though a considerable part of this appraisal has been undermined by events since the breakdown 
of Lehman Brothers, critical views on the future of US employment in services tend to share Friedman’s 
rather anecdotal evidence on US outward offshoring of services -- and unfortunately nearly all refrain from 
any quantitative analysis (Cf. Ritzer and Lair, 2007).
Yet, one of the ‘new wave’ authors has admitted that these studies only analyzed the expansion of al-
ready existing activities of US-based MNEs abroad and did not cover the effects of their expansion. Hence, 
up to now in-depth research into the so-called extensive margin or replacement effects of FDI has been 
virtually non-existent -- though these effects may be substantial in view of the building of domestic eco-
nomic capacity in China and India, not only in manufacturing but in services as well (Crinò, 2007, 38). On 
the other hand, based on data for 1990-2004, the same author recently found for nine Western European 
countries that service offshoring exerted positive and robust effects on domestic productivity (Crinò, 2008): 
a result that does not seem to correspond with considerable replacement effects – unless direct employment Page ● 17
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losses from relocation are larger than employment gains from productivity increases. Jensen and Kletzer 
(2007, 2008) and Blinder (2007) followed another road and explored the ‘offshorability’ of US (service) 
occupations. Jensen and Kletzer concluded for 2003-05 to 38 million ‘tradable’ or potentially offshorable 
jobs, nearly 30% of US workers (Jensen and Kletzer, 2007, 13). Yet, in a later paper they took it for “highly 
unlikely that a signiﬁ  cant share of high-wage, skill intensive activities will move to emerging markets in 
the short term and even in the long term” (2008, 8). Although his outcomes were similar, Blinder seemed 
less optimistic. He estimated “the outer limit of potential offshorability between 22% and 29% of all the 
jobs in the 2004 US workforce, with the upper half of that range perhaps more likely than the lower half” 
(Blinder, 2007, 35). Surprisingly, Blinder found almost no correlation between ‘offshorability’ and education: 
the more offshorable jobs were not ‘low-end’, whether measured by wages or by education. He even found 
some evidence that, controlling for education, in 2004 holders of the most highly-offshorable jobs were 
already paying a notable wage penalty. In an identical exercise for the German labour market based on 2007 
data, Schrader and Laaser (2009) came to similar ﬁ  ndings, but at higher levels of jobs at risk: according to 
them, around 53% of high-skilled jobs in Germany could potentially be outsourced, compared to around 
43% low-skilled jobs.
Employment and wage effects may well become more dramatic when MNEs based in high-income 
countries invest abroad horizontally, expanding innovative, high-skill and high value-added activities to oth-
er countries. Such practice can easily substitute labour at home. There is quite some evidence that in the 
course of the 2000s the offshoring of innovation expanded far beyond the earlier, rather exceptional cases 
of large MNEs from small home countries. A global race for highly qualiﬁ  ed talent seems to have emerged, 
not least initiated by US-based MNEs. Offshoring of R & D-intensive activities may be a logical conse-
quence, though intellectual property issues and restrictive government policies on FDI in particularly China 
can frustrate US- and Europe-based FDI and can counteract that tendency (Cf. Dossani and Kenney, 2007; 
Lewin et al, 2009; for a contradictory view Yu, 2007).
Swedish manufacturing has been a relatively early example of horizontal expansion of MNEs. Swedish 
researchers found evidence that in in the 1980s and 1990s the effects on domestic investment of these ﬁ  rms 
varied across industries, but remained positive for the more R&D-intensive manufacturing (Braunerhjelm 
and Oxelheim, 2000; Braunerhjelm et al, 2005). Konings and Murphy (2001, 2006), exploring wage cost dif-
ferentials across 13 EU countries for 1993-1998, found that substitution relationships existed to a limited 
extent and were mainly signiﬁ  cant for EU subsidiaries of northern European parent ﬁ  rms. Authors in this Page ● 18
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stream of research argued that negative effects on wages and employment were most likely limited to the 
short run (Cf. Bruno and Falzoni, 2003). In an effort to include more ‘real world’ elements in their analysis, 
Becker et al (2005) argued that cost reduction and market-seeking in FDI of European MNEs were often 
intertwined – as may also increasingly be the case with horizontal and vertical FDI. The coexistence of 
forms and motives of FDI complicates theoretical predictions about MNE behaviour. That said, Becker et 
al concluded that for German MNEs horizontal FDI had been stronger than cost reduction-driven FDI.
From another angle, in a study of German manufacturing MNEs Becker and Muendler (2007) showed 
that although ﬁ  rms changed their multinational presence infrequently, these changes gave rise to rare but 
salient labour demand effects in response to permanent wage differentials across locations. In line with this 
ﬁ  nding, Barba Navaretti et al (2003) found across 11 European countries that MNEs adjusted their labour 
demand faster and to a greater extent than domestic ﬁ  rms. These authors concluded that MNEs created 
and destroyed jobs faster than domestic ﬁ  rms, and thus were able to adjust more smoothly to shocks affect-
ing their labour demands. For any given wage increase, for example, in the longer run MNEs reduced total 
employment less than national ﬁ  rms. An OECD report (2007) report came to a similar conclusion, admit-
ting that the expansion of international production networks is potentially an important source of workers’ 
vulnerability. Unfortunately it is not very clear to what extent institutional factors were in play here, and what 
impact variations in, for example, labour market ﬂ  exibility and employment protection may have had. What 
can be observed is that institutional factors do matter and to a considerable extent impact on the outcomes 
of offshoring in terms of wages and employment (Cf. Anderton et al, 2002). Thus, we have to consider 
the prevailing ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancké et al, 2007) in this respect. There 
are signiﬁ  cant indications that FDI has had more negative effects in terms of income inequality in liberal 
market economies (LMEs) with highly ﬂ  exible labour markets – not only in developing countries but also in 
Europe. One route along which negative effects would work is the greater volatility of MNE employment 
in LME countries due to the greater institutional opportunities relocation and dismissal. In 2003, studies for 
Ireland (Görg and Strobl, 2003) and the UK (Fabbri et al, 2003) showed that, when controlled for a number 
of factors, employment in MNEs had been more at risk than jobs in domestic ﬁ  rms. As most recent plant 
closure evidence underlines, this deﬁ  nitely holds for investments with few linkages with the local economies 
(Cf. Storrie and Ward, 2007; European Foundation, 2009a). However, as we will see in the next section, Page ● 19
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Ireland represents a special case, in which we have to distinguish between employment and wage effects.
In coordinated market economies (CMEs) with regulated labour markets, like Germany, France and 
Austria, the employment and wage behaviour of MNEs and domestic ﬁ  rms seems rather similar. Analysis 
of German ﬁ  rm-level datasets showed that MNEs did not respond systematically more to wages and output 
than did ﬁ  rms only active on the domestic market, while the durability of employment of both ﬁ  rm types 
was nearly the same (Buch and Lipponer, 2007; Becker and Muendler, 2008). For Germany during 1999-
2001, Becker and Muendler (2008) even found a somewhat lower separation rate for MNEs: more educated 
workers in particular stayed with the ﬁ  rm to a larger extent than in non-MNEs, a result that the authors 
argue is a consequence of FDI abroad by the MNEs. Similar results have been reported for France over an 
earlier period (1977-1993). According to Strauss-Kahn (2003), during that period skill-biased technologi-
cal change (SBTC) contributed much more to the deteriorating position of unskilled labour and to grow-
ing wage inequality than FDI did. She argued that the strong French labour market institutions prevented 
downward wage adaptation; as a result, predominantly the employment prospects of unskilled workers were 
affected. For Austria, Egger and Egger (2003) traced similar effects. The outsourcing of manufacturing to 
CEECs had little effect on the Austrian wage rates, an outcome that the authors attributed to the country’s 
centralized collective bargaining system with a strong trade union position; however, they concluded that 
the employment prospects of the low-skilled had deteriorated. By contrast, Lorentowicz et al (2005) found 
that between 1995 and 2002 offshoring from Austria decreased the relative wages for its skilled workers by 
2%. They suggested the poorness of Austria’s human capital levels relative to those of its largest trading 
partners, mainly CEECs, as a main explanation.
1.4.  FDI in host countries
There is a rapidly expanding strand of literature on the likelihood of MNEs paying higher wages than 
domestic ﬁ  rms for comparable jobs, and of growing wage inequality in MNE host countries. For some years 
researchers’ attention was focused on the effects of FDI in (manufacturing in) developing countries. They 
consistently found signiﬁ  cant wage premia in foreign over domestic enterprises, hardly any evidence of 
wage spillovers from FDI leading to higher wages for domestic ﬁ  rms in these host countries (Aitken et al, 
1996, for Mexico, Venezuela, and the US; Feenstra and Hanson, 1997, for Mexico’s maquilladoras; Lipsey and 
Sjöholm, 2004, for Indonesian manufacturing; Brown et al, 2003, and Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2005, for over-
views), and no or a weak relation between FDI and the reduction of wage inequality (for ﬁ  ve sub-Sahara Page ● 20
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African countries: Te Velde and Morrissey, 2001; for East Asia: Te Velde and Morrissey, 2004). An analysis 
of WageIndicator data for 2007 learned that in Argentina, Brazil, India and Mexico MNEs on average paid 
signiﬁ  cantly higher wages than domestic companies, whereas no such differences could be found for South 
Korea and South Africa (Stöteler, 2008). 
However, between developing and high-income countries the forms, motives and approaches of MNE 
expansion may differ so much (as do economic, social and political conditions), that transplanting conclu-
sions from the one country category to the other is highly risky. Fortunately recent research has avoided 
such pitfalls and has shed light on the wage effects of FDI in European host countries. For example, using 
a panel of over 100 countries for the period 1980 to 2000, Figini and Görg (2006) concluded that the re-
lationship between inward FDI and wage inequality differs, depending on the country’s level of economic 
development. According to their results, in developed countries FDI inﬂ  ows in manufacturing can be as-
sociated with larger wage inequality (increased wage dispersion), though this effect decreases over time. 
Earlier, these authors found that FDI was associated with increased wage dispersion in Irish manufacturing 
over 1979-1995 (Figini and Görg, 1999). FDI effects in the UK have been the most widely researched. For 
this country Taylor and Drifﬁ  eld (2005) found that the overall impact of FDI explained, on average, 11% 
of wage inequality in the period 1983 to 1992; Hijzen (2007) by and large conﬁ  rmed these outcomes for 
the next six years, 1993-1998. Girma and Görg (2007), covering the period 1980-1994, argued that in the 
case of foreign take-overs the nationality of the acquirer matters. They found that both skilled and unskilled 
workers in the UK experienced on average a substantial wage increase after being taken over by a US ﬁ  rm, 
while no such effects were discernable following acquisitions by EU ﬁ  rms.
In reviewing this ﬁ  eld, we may conclude that a large majority of empirical studies has established that 
MNEs in developed countries have paid a ‘wage premium’ over the wages of domestic ﬁ  rms for comparable 
jobs (besides earlier references, in general: Lipsey, 2002; OECD, 2008a; for the UK: Girma et al, 2001; for 
Germany: Geishecker and Görg, 2004; for Hungary: Earle and Telegdy, 2007; for the Netherlands, based on 
2004-2006 WageIndicator data: Fortanier, 2008). It has also been established that this premium tended to be 
larger for high-skilled staff (Taylor and Drifﬁ  eld, 2005; Hijzen, 2007; Fortanier, 2008), though already in the 
early 2000s there was some counter-evidence to this (Girma and Görg, 2007). It should be noted that the 
most recent studies show a growing number of reservations. They stress the short-term character of posi-
tive effects on average wages. Much of the variation found may be due to differences in ﬁ  rm characteristics. 
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and to operate in industries with higher wages, reﬂ  ecting higher productivity and higher capital and/or R & 
D intensity. These may also be called ‘selection effects’ in developed countries where foreign-owned ﬁ  rms 
most likely ‘select’ plants and workers with relatively high wages, as has been found for the UK (Conyon et al, 
2002; Girma and Görg, 2006) and Portugal (Almeida, 2007). Indeed, research in the last decade, using more 
advanced statistical analyses and controlling for ﬁ  rm size and industry distribution, revealed a considerably 
smaller wage premium in foreign-owned ﬁ  rms than had earlier been found in the more aggregated studies. 
Most of these recent studies have been based on matched employer-employee data, like those of Martins 
(2004) for Portugal; Andrews et al (2007) for Germany; Malchow-Møller et al (2007) for Denmark; Heyman 
et al (2007) for Sweden; Huttunen (2007) for Finland, and Alkahimi and Peoples (2009) for the US. Some 
of these studies showed quite small or even non-existent wage differentials when controlled for size and 
industry. For example, foreign takeovers of Swedish ﬁ  rms tended to have zero or even negative effects on 
wages (Heyman et al, 2007), as did acquisitions by EU-based MNEs of UK ﬁ  rms (Girma and Görg, 2007). 
In the end it is quite hard to conclude whether smaller or disappearing MNE wage premia result from more 
advanced research methodology and improved data collection or indicate real changes over time, though in 
Scandinavian countries a longer-term decrease of MNE wage premia may be plausible.
Ireland is a highly interesting case located somewhere between the classical Anglo-Saxon model of 
industrial relations and centralized bargaining regimes, where from 1987 until 2009 national wage agree-
ments were in existence, allowing unions a signiﬁ  cant voice in pay issues. It is also one of the world’s most 
FDI- and MNE-dependent economies, with in 2007 inward FDI stocks as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) estimated at 74% (world average: 28% -- UNCTAD, 2008) and nearly half of all manu-
facturing employment in MNEs (European Foundation, 2009b). Moreover MNEs, notably the US-based, 
in Ireland have developed a tradition of union avoidance while establishing new sites (Geary and Roche, 
2001; Gunnigle et al, 2008). Both Leahy and Montagna (2000) and Baccaro and Simoni (2007) have argued 
that MNEs may prefer to locate in countries with centralized wage bargaining due to the likely gains in 
competitiveness and their argument indeed seems to ﬁ  t quite well with the Irish experience. American 
MNEs’ subsidiaries, though mostly non-unionized, were bound by the centralized agreements by virtue of 
their membership with IBEC, the Irish employer association (Baccaro and Simoni, 2007, 440-1). For 2003, 
MNEs implementing the national wage agreement had average labour costs that not only fell below those 
of MNEs implementing other types of agreements but were also lower than those in the domestic sector 
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As we have already indicated, the outcomes of MNE versus domestic wages may develop differently 
in EU countries with ﬂ  exible labour markets. Next to the Anglo-Saxon countries, in the current crisis one 
might conclude that this could also happen in the transition economies of Central and East European 
Countries (CEECs). After the fall of communism, FDI in most CEECs rose quickly, leading to consider-
able output growth in low-skill and resource-intensive industries but also –stimulated by a large pool of 
skilled workers-- in more capital-and R&D-intensive automotive and electrical machinery production (Ra-
dosevic et al, 2003; Fillat-Castejón and Woerz, 2005; Marin, 2006a). At the end of 2004, Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic had attracted three quarters of FDI in the 10 new member states from the EU-15, 
mainly from Germany, France and Austria (Eurostat, 2007). Partly FDI concerned greenﬁ  eld investments 
with (initially) positive employment effects in CEECs but take-overs of mostly privatized state companies 
followed another course. During 1992-2001, foreign take-overs in Hungary led to considerable long-term 
wage premia, albeit after a major reduction of the workforce (Csengödi et al, 2008). Already from the mid-
1990s on, a trend towards a decrease in the wage share in sectors with considerable FDI and growing wage 
inequality linked with inward FDI became visible, notably in the export-oriented manufacturing industries 
of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (Egger and Stehrer, 2003; Lorentowicz et al, 2005; 
Fillat-Castejón and Woerz, 2005; Marin, 2006b; Onaran and Stockhammer, 2006). This trend has likely 
been sharpened by the mass dismissals taking place in 2009-2010 in CEEC plants of multinational car and 
electronics producers and their subcontractors (Cf. Glassner and Galgóczi, 2009; various press messages). 
Though the evidence from the literature is still rather dispersed, we are able tentatively to conclude that 
in developed countries home and host country wage effects of FDI tend to work in the same direction. In 
high-income countries both inward and outbound vertical FDI gave rise to wage differentials particularly 
favouring skilled workers in MNEs thus adding to growing wage inequality, but in the 2000s these effects 
seem to have dried up and the wage effects of new FDI have decreased over time. Horizontal FDI seems 
to have slightly less positive effects, but the same trends over time may be discernable. In high-income 
countries with ﬂ  exible labour markets MNE wage premia on average seem lower and most likely exert low-
ering inﬂ  uence as well. Wage premia of inward FDI in the transition economies of the CEECs may remain 
substantial, but under pressure of the current crisis they seem likely to be shared among smaller groups of 
workers, contributing to growing wage inequality.Page ● 23
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1.5.   Causes of wage differentials
We turn now to the possible causes of MNE wage differentials. The usual explanation for the wage 
premium paid in MNE subsidiaries is the productivity advantage of FDI over domestic ﬁ  rms. Most of the 
literature here is based on comparing the performance of foreign and domestic ﬁ  rms in the US (Cf. Doms 
and Jensen, 1998) and in the UK (Cf. Girma et al, 2001). However, for highly-developed EU countries with 
many home-based MNEs a ‘foreign ownership advantage’ is questionable. For example, an in-depth study 
for Germany showed that, while German non-MNEs were less productive than foreign-owned ﬁ  rms, there 
was no such difference between German MNEs and subsidiaries of foreign MNEs. Thus, productivity 
spillovers could have two sources, foreign MNEs as well as domestic MNEs (Temouri et al, 2008). Others 
“conﬁ  rm with British data that the foreign ownership advantage is indeed by and large an MNE advantage” 
(Criscuolo and Martin, 2005, 3). Against this backdrop, focusing on an ‘MNE effect’ seems more adequate.
However, ‘productivity’ remains a very wide explanatory category. Following in the footsteps of Solow 
(1957), modern economic theory has emphasized productivity advantages through technological innovation 
as a major source of the comparative advantage of rich nations over others. Authoritative writers like Mi-
chael Porter (1990) have applied this insight to the rise of MNEs and the expansion of FDI. What is more, 
technology and skills seem closely interconnected. MNEs are generally regarded as the main drivers of skill-
biased technological change which naturally favours skilled workers and thus looks like the predominant 
source of wage inequality. Moreover, international evidence shows that the increase of skill levels largely 
occurs within rather than across industries (Berman et al, 1998; Machin, 2001). This does not imply that 
‘technology’ is a unidimensional category. For example, the technological advantages of MNEs might show 
up in better production technology, superior supporting and intermediate technologies (IT, logistics), more 
intensive use of intermediate products, or better management techniques – the latter in itself representing 
a broad category (Cf. Lipsey, 2002, 57; Malchow-Møller et al, 2007, 5). Yet, it is here that the Achilles heels 
of many MNEs can be found, as they have turned out to be not particularly good at managing their foreign 
i.e. global activities (Among many others: Gooderham and Nordhaug, 2003, 12).
The relationship between higher MNE productivity and their size --as a whole as well as of their es-
tablishments-- is not easy to grasp and much awaits explanation (Helpman, 2006, 597). Whilst it is widely 
acknowledged that both MNEs and MNE afﬁ  liates are larger than their comparable domestic competitors, 
it remains to be seen whether these differences end up in productivity advantages. In technologically ad-
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the former are dominant. For example, based on an analysis of foreign take-overs in the UK electronics and 
food industries, Girma and Görg (2006, 16) show that positive effects on productivity growth are due to 
changes in technical efﬁ  ciency, not to scale effects. Anyway, in our analysis of the wage effects of FDI that 
follows we will control for establishment size.
The role of human capital in creating wage premia for workers in MNEs cannot be ignored, though 
the empirical evidence is not overwhelming at this point. The outcomes of Görg et al (2007) lend some 
support to an explanation in terms of ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c human capital acquisition: tenure (years of experience) 
may be important, as workers may acquire MNE wage premia over time through on-the-job-training. Yet, 
their evidence concerned FDI in Ghana, and the OECD (2008a, 5) counter-argument that these effects 
will most likely be smaller in developed countries seems plausible. By contrast, it can be argued that wage 
premia based on vocational training may be substantial in developed countries with industry-wide vocational 
training institutions, like Germany, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. Moreover, even in these coun-
tries the more general labour market argument may be valid: skilled workers may be attracted by working 
in an MNE, notably by the prospect of receiving extensive training, which also opens up opportunities for 
internal promotion. Although starting wages in MNEs may not be higher than in domestic ﬁ  rms, workers 
in MNEs may receive more and/or more efﬁ  cient on-the-job training and derive a stronger wage growth 
from that training. MNE afﬁ  liates have often proved willing to pay ‘efﬁ  ciency wages’ as coined by Akerlof 
and Yellen (1986), including a premium and related pressure in order to commit and retain skilled workers 
and avoid them to change jobs to domestic companies or start their own business (Cf. Fortanier, 2008, 38). 
Labour market competition following from this attractiveness of MNEs for skilled workers may contribute 
to push domestic ﬁ  rms into less proﬁ  table market segments with lower productivity (as found for US manu-
facturing industry: Keller and Yeaple, 2003) – and most likely lower wages. Thus, in our analysis we will also 
control for tenure and educational level of the workers involved.
Here it is relevant to broaden our scope beyond that of labour markets and point to factors related to 
national industrial relations and business systems as potential causes of wage premia. A central debate in 
the international management literature is that reﬂ  ecting the degree of global integration (globalisation) 
that MNEs seek to achieve versus the degree of local adaptation (localisation) that is deemed necessary, 
in particular in the HRM strategies and practices of MNEs – or, in other words, on the relative force of 
home country or country-of-origin effects versus host country effects. Unfortunately, the available em-
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vailed that MNEs tended to replicate their home-country production and management structures in host 
countries, and diffuse management practice from home to host countries.. Indeed, MNEs have developed 
international management structures speciﬁ  cally for diffusing ‘best practices’ across countries and sites. 
Similarly, where company bargaining prevails MNE headquarters have increasingly been able to inﬂ  uence 
local bargaining outcomes through monitoring and benchmarking. Likewise, outside the bargaining arena, 
MNE headquarters are able to exercise more or less continuous ‘coercive comparisons’ of labour costs, 
working practices, and site and department performance across countries and locations. It is also obvious 
that most benchmarking features and standards originate from strategies and practices shaped in the home 
country, deﬁ  nitely if they are deeply rooted in its industrial relations and related institutions and cultures 
(Cf. Kostova, 1999; Edwards et al, 1999; Sisson et al, 2003; Pulignano, 2006; Farndale and Paauwe, 2007). As 
Marginson (2009, 67) has argued, the effects on collective bargaining outcomes may vary, but in car manu-
facturing for instance, deployment of coercive comparisons has resulted in a series of matching concessions 
over borders in which the substantive bargaining outcome at different locations was similar. In particular in 
the automotive sector union negotiators in the 2000s have often been under pressure from management’s 
cross-border coordination of local negotiations, much more developed here than for instance in banking 
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006). 
We should emphasize, however, that the propensity to diffuse so-called ‘best practice’ is still, to a greater 
or lesser extent, constrained by features of ‘national business systems’ or national industrial relations sys-
tems of the host countries – though the available evidence on this issue is rather ambiguous. Some have 
concluded that MNEs are likely to adapt their human resources (HR) practices to national systems where 
these systems are highly institutionalized and regulated, notably in CMEs, and leave their subsidiaries more 
autonomy in countries with such systems (Ferner, 1997; Edwards, 2000). In contrast, more recently it was 
found that US MNEs were more motivated to seek control of HR practices in subsidiaries located in CMEs 
than in those located in LMEs – though the incidence of strong unions interferes: the higher the level 
of unionisation in a subsidiary the less the US MNE was inclined to impose centralized control (Fenton-
O’Creevy et al, 2008). Of course, neither MNEs nor national industrial relations settings can be considered 
static entities; complex processes of mutual interaction are continuously at stake. For example, it has been 
found for Germany that US MNEs, though formally accepting the host country’s dominant industrial rela-
tions institutions like industry-wide collective bargaining, may seek to weaken links with those institutions 
and orient themselves on company-level bargaining with less union inﬂ  uence (Singe and Croucher, 2005). Page ● 26
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Another example is the penetration of Anglo-Saxon HRM practices in Netherlands-based MNEs, shown in 
a study of AIAS colleagues (Van der Meer et al, 2004).
It has been suggested that MNEs from different countries of origin tend to follow different routes. 
We focus here on differences between US-, Germany- and Japan-based MNEs, as their HRM behaviour is 
rather comprehensively researched. Traditionally, US-based MNEs have been key diffusers of ‘Taylorism’, 
where highly formalized structures and routines at shop ﬂ  oor level are buttressed with industrial relations 
innovations like productivity bargaining and performance-based pay. US labour market institutions and in-
dustrial relations continue to pose less constraints for managerial behaviour vis-a-vis the labour force than 
they do in continental-European CMEs (Cf. Gautié and Schmitt, 2010). American MNEs compared to their 
Europe-based counterparts additionally tended to be more centralized with regard to HRM and industrial 
relations issues, to use more formalised and standardized systems and procedures (Martin and Beaumont, 
1999; Ferner et al, 2004), as well as to avoid wherever possible employee representation and trade union 
inﬂ  uence as much as in the US (Tempel et al, 2006). US-based MNEs seemed particularly sensible for the ’in-
stitutional distance’ between the US and host countries, while at the same time top management maintained 
considerable pressure for internal coherence (Cf. Kostova and Roth, 2002). Case studies have shown that 
US MNEs in various European host countries would initially make strenuous efforts as to ﬁ  t national HR 
and employment policies in their globally integrated models, but in particular in cases of mergers with and 
acquisitions of European ﬁ  rms ﬂ  exibility turned out to be incorporated into global approaches. National 
variation may show up if headquarters accept that pre-existing practices should be left in place. That will 
especially be the case in MNEs with highly diversiﬁ  ed, local market-oriented or extractive operations that 
(have to) differ in character in various countries (Child et al, 2000; Almond et al, 2005; Edwards et al, 2006; 
Rees and Edwards, 2009). We have to add that, at least in the UK, in case of US acquirers the primary ori-
entation of the subsidiary often went into a more ﬁ  nancial direction (Child et al, 2000).
American MNEs and American management style have been dominant in the 1950s, the 1960s and most 
of the 1970s, setting the standard for what worldwide were perceived as best practices and pressing towards 
the global convergence of HRM practices – labelled the dominance effect by Smith and Meiksins (1995). 
German management practice has often been regarded as the antithesis of US-based practice. German 
MNEs have also exported elements of their domestic HR practices, though often more subtly and smoothly 
than US MNEs. For instance, in many German subsidiaries in the UK, the USA and Spain home-country 
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been imitated (Ferner and Varul, 2000; Tempel, 2001). Yet, instead of ‘exporting’ features of Germany’s 
system of co-determination and consultation, it is equally plausible that German MNEs in host countries 
are looking to escape such features – partly depending on host-country inﬂ  uences, with for example clear 
differences between the institutional settings of Hungary and Slovenia (Marginson and Meardi, 2006, 97). 
Japanese MNEs are known to have pioneered major changes in work organization and pay systems in 
their subsidiaries in the US and Western Europe, bringing these systems initially close to manufacturing 
practices dominating in Japan. From the late 1970s till the early 1990s, the Japanese management model 
rivalled the American dominance. In the 1990s, however, the Japanese economy as well as the traditional 
Japanese management model went into a crisis from which neither have fully recovered. Japanese manage-
ment as associated with lean production has lost much of attractiveness; many experts have judged that in 
particular Japanese HRM needs thorough reform (Cf. Pudelko, 2006, 2009), a judgment to which recently 
many Japanese HR managers adhere as well (Pudelko and Harzing, 2010). Pudelko and Harzing (2007), 
exploring a large sample of MNEs headquartered in the US, Japan, and Germany, as well as subsidiaries of 
MNEs from these countries in the respective two other countries, over-all found strong dominance effects: 
US-based MNEs intended to stick more closely to their own HRM system, and both Japanese and German 
MNEs oriented themselves to US practices, the Japanese even more so than the Germans.
With the re-emergence of the American economy as rather dominant worldwide (though growingly 
sharing power with the BRIC economies), it is again American HRM practices that are embraced as exem-
plary. Nevertheless, industry differences, reﬂ  ecting the interplay of market and organizational structures, 
remain highly relevant here – and may become even more relevant as industry characteristics are diverg-
ing. Low levels of market diversiﬁ  cation as well as highly standardized and rationalized operations, as have 
prevailed in car manufacturing, have pushed towards standardized management practice, including HRM, 
and methods of work organization. Service industries like hotels and catering have even displayed the rise 
of standardised, rationalized and ‘industrialized’ processes, and here benchmarking and monitoring show 
up once more as highly effective management instruments to control labour input and labour costs. MNE 
headquarters in these industries continue to have strong incentives to centralize industrial relations decision-
making and to exert control over HR practices in host countries. The hotel and catering industry may pro-
vide the bottom-line, where US MNEs as a rule have stuck strictly to their home country practices, including 
union avoidance, low trust in management – worker relations, minimal training and work intensiﬁ  cation, 
and pushing wage rates even below the legal ﬂ  oors. The fast-food service sector (Royle, 2000, 2004, 2006) 
provides striking examples, and so does hotel room cleaning (Vanselow et al, 2010).Page ● 28
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By contrast, MNEs likely will impose less centralized control on HR practices of subsidiaries in more 
sophisticated and innovative production or servicing. As multinational operations develop in a less standard-
ized and more complex direction away from Taylorism, power relations between the actors at local level, or 
the ‘politics of the organizational dimension’, become ever more crucial. Hence, processes of HRM transfer 
in MNEs are increasingly inﬂ  uenced by a shifting mix of factors that embrace internal governance mecha-
nisms, dimensions power and social capital (including trust-building and vision-sharing), HR management 
systems of subsidiaries, and headquarters’ change management capabilities. In complex and innovative 
processes with high levels of managerial uncertainty, MNE headquarters may deem the issuing of formal 
policies and guidelines on employment practices counterproductive. Such ‘direct control’ may restrict the 
ability of site managers to respond ﬂ  exibly to host country conditions and would discourage these manag-
ers (Edwards et al, 1999, 290). Against this backdrop, the analysis of host-country institutions has also to 
embrace the strategies of management and workers’ representatives at the subsidiary level (Sisson et al, 2003; 
Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005; Björkman and Lervik, 2007; Rees and Edwards, 2009). Processes of organi-
zational politics may continue to be shaped by markets, production structures and national institutions, but 
micro-political activity grows in importance in embedding MNE activities in the industrial relations settings 
of host countries (Cf. Ferner and Edwards, 1995; Ferner et al, 2005; Edwards et al, 2007). Case studies of 
HR policies in (American) MNEs show that even where national institutional frameworks are comparatively 
strong and constrain and complicate the transfer of HR practices, they remain porous, presenting barriers 
to transfer that are partial rather than absolute. Where transfer of HR practices does occur, actors at lower 
levels, including local management, are often able to draw on their knowledge of local institutions to mould 
the complex processes in which they are involved in order to protect or further their interests (Edwards et al, 
2007, 214-5; see also Freeman et al, 2007; for US MNEs in the UK and Italy: Pulignano, 2006, and in Spain: 
Quintanilla et al, 2008).
In host countries as different as the UK and Germany, managers of US subsidiaries often accumulated 
resources based on (their use of) the local institutional environment, playing a role as ‘interpreters’ of that 
environment for parent company management (Ferner, 1997, 2000; Tempel et al, 2006). In more deregulated 
host countries with weaker institutions, as in many CEECs, the deployment of effective HR policies may 
call for the larger involvement of local actors anyway. MNEs here may draw beneﬁ  t from social interactions 
and from local institutional resources, and may take up a substantial role in shaping their institutional envi-
ronment; they may develop from institutional rule-takers into institutional rule-makers. MNEs may come to Page ● 29
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view the local subsidiary as the optimal organizational level for decision-making on work practices. In these 
cases, workers and (weak) trade unions may be left to the discretion of MNEs, and may have little impact 
on spillovers in terms of wages and working conditions (Kahancová and Van der Meer, 2005; Kahancová, 
2010). From a workers’ point of view, the reverse diffusion of such practices, from host to home countries, 
may have serious implications for industrial relations and employment practices in the home countries (Cf. 
Edwards, 2000; Edwards et al, 2005; Edwards and Tempel, 2010). Again, the automotive industry provides 
evidence of negative effects on labour. Under the exercise of coercive comparisons, the gap in labour costs 
between MNE afﬁ  liates in CEECs and Germany has bolstered local management’s efforts to change work 
practices at German sites as well as to repel the inﬂ  uence of German works councils (Marginson, 2009, 67).
It should be noted that responding to the emergence of a single ‘regulatory space’ in the European 
Union, many MNEs, whatever their country of origin, have created Europeanized structures. EU and EMU 
rule-setting has increasingly created an EU-wide level playing ﬁ  eld for ﬁ  rms operating in various member 
states. In an emerging system of multi-level governance, EU directives have inﬂ  uenced the shaping of a 
wide variety of issues like working time, parental leave, and notably employee representation, information 
and consultation, as well as related employment practices (Cf. Sisson et al, 2003; Ferner et al, 2004; Margin-
son and Sisson, 2006). The development of EU legislation, combined with the advance of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) ideology and the related push for transparency mechanisms (Fortanier, 2008), has put 
pressure on MNEs to avoid discrimination particularly on gender and working hours issues. Recent ﬁ  ndings 
on CSR suggest that the majority of MNEs comply with these new legal frameworks that add to the existing 
OECD and ILO standards, though there may still be quite a lot of window-dressing going on here (Cf. Van 
Tulder and Van der Zwart, 2006; Fortanier and Kolk, 2007). Exploratory research points to cases of MNEs 
in which home country workers’ representatives and/or the EWC challenged HR departments to turn cor-
porate CSR commitment into ‘hard law’, likely resulting in regulation concerning equal opportunities, equal 
pay and working conditions codifying standards above levels collectively agreed (Preuss et al, 20097). Domes-
tic competitors, less prone to such mechanisms, may, paradoxically, be more tempted to create or maintain 
discriminatory practices. These policy differences may be another factor creating MNE wage premia. Thus, 
our analysis will also control for possible wage discrimination against females and part-time workers.
7  Although in other cases workers’ representatives perceived CSR initiatives as a potential threat to their position – understand-
able particularly where ﬁ  rms becoming ‘socially responsible’ may tend to ignore existing co-determination and bargaining 
channels and ‘privatise’ the governance of workers’ rights (Cf. Preuss, 2008).Page ● 30
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Finally we have to emphasize one caveat. Except for the last wave of American research on the home ef-
fect of service FDI, the studies covered in this section concentrate heavily on manufacturing i.e. on material 
offshoring. In this respect they are only directly relevant for one of the ﬁ  ve industries in our project, namely 
metal and electronics manufacturing. In spite of the fact that the services sector is going to dominate FDI 
ﬂ  ows, and in 2006 accounted for 62% of the world inward FDI stock (up from 49% in 1990 -- UNCTAD, 
2008, 9), studies on FDI and its determinants are biased against service offshoring (Riedl, 2008, 2). Gold-
berg (2004, 6) concluded that data on the effects of ﬁ  nancial FDI in this respect “have not yet been parsed 
out”. This conclusion still holds, and can be drawn for other parts of the services sector too. This is all the 
more interesting as the effects of FDI in services may differ essentially from those of manufacturing FDI. 
For example, this seems more generally the case for adjustment paths. Research in eight newly accessed EU 
countries showed that it took ﬁ  ve years for FDI in the manufacturing sector to adjust to its equilibrium level. 
By contrast, service FDI reaches this within two years (Riedl, 2008, 3).Page ● 31
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2.  The AIAS MNE Database
In this chapter we present an overview of the contents of the AIAS MNE Database, and some analyses 
of data derived from this database. First, we will set out the aim and the design of the database. Second, we 
will go into a number of outcomes, notably into the spread of foreign direct investment (FDI) over host 
and home countries using some yardsticks for concentration in FDI. We have to emphasize that our ﬁ  ndings 
cover the state of affairs of FDI and internationalization for March 2008, linked with company data (sales 
and employment ﬁ  gures) for 2006 and 2007.
2.1.  Aim and design of the MNE Database
The aim of the AIAS MNE database is to permit analysis of the answers in the WageIndicator web-survey 
to the question in what company do respondents work. This question enables analyses of the country-spe-
ciﬁ  c impact of FDI on wages and working conditions, as well as comparing wages across countries within 
one company. In the database, two or more establishments in one country are not distinguished as separate 
entities, but establishments are distinguished if they are found in two or more industries.
In most countries, the WageIndicator web-survey contains a survey question “What is the name of  the com-
pany where you work?” Generally in surveys, an open text ﬁ  eld is used to store the answers to this question. 
In the case of the WageIndicator survey, respondents ﬁ  rst tick the industry where they work, and then a list 
of company names in this particular industry pops up. At the bottom of the list, the option ‘Other’ allows 
respondents to key in the company name if that name is not listed. The option “Don’t want to say” facilitates 
respondents not to identify the name of the company they work for.
For most countries, lists of company names are not publicly available, and therefore, a company list 
had to be composed. For the sake of our research, a multinational enterprise (MNE) has been deﬁ  ned as 
an enterprise with subsidiaries in more than one country. In addition and for the sake of comparison in 
later stages, a number of large domestic companies (DOM) in any of the ﬁ  ve industries has been included. 
A third category speciﬁ  c for the retail industry has been added: co-operative and voluntary chains (VCs).
Asking individuals in what company they work will elicit an answer referring to the name of the estab-
lishment and maybe not of the MNE. It may even be the case that respondents do not know the proper 
name of ‘their’ MNE. Experience shows that this often happens shortly after take-overs. Therefore, the 
database has to include the names of the MNE establishments in the countries at stake. In order to facilitate Page ● 32
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searching through the search tree, the database needs to include the industry of the establishment. In some 
cases, a subsidiary is allocated to two or more sub-sectors. This is facilitated in the database. For the divi-
sion in sub-sectors we used the 4-digit NACE coding. In total, we distinguished 39 sub-sectors. In the retail 
and ICT industries we grouped some MNEs under NACE code 67121, ‘hedge funds, private equity funds’.
Table 2.1 provides an example of (parts of) the MNE database, with an overview of the columns used: 
industry, sub-sector, company name, MNE/DOM/VC, subsidiary name, establishment name, host country 
incidence (Note that only four of 12 countries are presented here, due to limitations of page size). The 
establishment is the key unit in the database. This unit is related to a subsidiary, which in turn is related to 
a company. In addition, the database includes the name of the home country (nationality) of the company.
In our database we do not register addresses or places of establishment. Per country, an establishment 
of a certain subsidiary is only counted once. For example, even if a subsidiary of a supermarket chain has 
700 establishments in country A operating under a certain name, these establishments are counted as one 
(See the No’s in the table under the eight rows ‘Auchan’).
Table 2.1   Examples of parts of the AIAS MNE database: industry, sub-sector, company name / nationality, 
MNE/domestic ﬁ  rm, subsidiary name, establishment name, country incidence 
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We can add the following concerning the variable names and the coding. The dataset that is derived from 
the survey responses includes a number of variables, which are listed below in Table 2.2. The primary unit 
of the database, MNSUBS, has a 9 to 12-digit code whereby:
1)  2 digits indicate the subsidiary of the MNE, ranged between 11 and 99;
2)  4-6 digits indicate the NACE industry-code of the establishment of the subsidiary.Page ● 34
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Table 2.2  List of variables and variable names for the AIAS MNE database
Variable Label
MNSUBS the name of the establishment
MNSUBS1 the name of the subsidiary
MNECOMPA the name of the MNE 
MNEMULTI indicating whether MNECOMPA is a multinational enterprise (MNE), a domestic company 
(DOM) , or a co-operative and voluntary chain (VC)
MNNACEHQ the NACE industry code of the headquarters of the MNE
MNHMCNTRY the MNE home country
MNEinBE the subsidiary has at least one establishment in Belgium
MNEinDE the subsidiary has at least one establishment in Germany
etc etc. for all 12 countries
MNEtotct  the total number of countries where the subsidiary has at least one establishment, with a maxi-
mum of twelve countries
The names of the companies, subsidiaries and establishments included in the MNE Database are as much 
as possible adequately phrased. Concerning the companies, this implies a correct use of capital and lower 
caps, the full name, and as far as possible the abbreviation of the legal entity. In the abbreviations no dots 
are used.
Table 2.3  Legal entities used for companies included in the WIBAR-2 MNE database






















After some initial data-cleaning, in a two-step process the data has as much as possible been re-coded 
into company names. First, the keyed establishment name is compared with the list of all establishments in 
the database. In case of a match, the variable MNSUBS is assigned the appropriate code. Second, in case of 
no match, the establishment name is checked for validity, and once passed this threshold, these names are Page ● 35
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auto-recoded into the variable MNSUBS.
The data was collected through existing knowledge of industries and enterprises combined with recent 
information gathered mainly through the Internet. At the basis were industry studies carried out since 2000 
by AIAS and STZ consultancy & research, notably on retail, ﬁ  nance, call centres, ICT, electronics manu-
facturing, and parts of the transport industry. This knowledge was additionally brought up-to-date through 
searches of company annual reports, with UNCTAD publications as a starting point, and further search ac-
tions via Google and Wikipedia. Names and ownership relations have been updated to April 1, 2008. Thus, 
ownership relations as of that date have been the starting point for our analyses.
2.2.  Contents of the MNE Database
We ﬁ  rst present an overview of the contents of the AIAS MNE Database. Table 2.4 shows the divi-
sion across industries of the 412 MNEs with in total 1,045 subsidiaries and 4,204 establishments in the 12 
countries involved.











Metal & electronics manufacturing 120 297 2.5 1,735 5.8
Finance & call centres 67 229 3.4 759 3.3
Transport 71 181 2.5 634 3.5
ICT 62 81 1.3 437 5.4
Retail 92 257 2.8 639 2.5
Total 412 1,045 2.5 4,204 4.0
Metal and electronics manufacturing is the category best represented in our database, with 29% of all 
MNEs, 28% of all subsidiaries and 41% of all establishments. In two respects retail follows, with 22% of 
all MNEs and 25% of all subsidiaries but with only 15% of all establishments. The ﬁ  nance and call centre 
sector ranks higher than retail in terms of the share of establishments (18%), but lower considering its share 
in the number of MNEs (16%) and of subsidiaries (22%).
Some rough analytical divisions can be based on the database materials, concerning respectively diver-
siﬁ  cation and internationalization across industries. First, the average number of subsidiaries per company 
(column Subs : MNE) can act as a measure for the diversiﬁ  cation of MNE interests. From this angle, ﬁ  nance 
and call centres turn out to be most diversiﬁ  ed, with on average 3.4 subsidiaries per company, followed by 
retail (average 2.8). With an average of 2.5, metal and electronics manufacturing and transport are on a par 
in this respect, and with 1.3 subsidiaries on average the ICT industry is by far least diversiﬁ  ed.Page ● 36
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Second, the average number of establishments per subsidiary (column Establ : Subs) can be used as a 
measure of the internationalization per subsidiary – though, as some MNEs may have subsidiaries mainly or 
totally focusing on speciﬁ  c countries, it does not, per se, indicate the extent of internationalization per MNE. 
By this yardstick, subsidiaries of metal and electronics manufacturing prove to be the most internationalized 
with, on average, 5.8 establishments, followed by the ICT industry (5.4 establishments). Transport, ﬁ  nance 
and call centres and retail follow at a wider distance.
2.3.  First analysis using the MNE Database
Table 2.5 is compiled from ﬁ  ve tables in the industry chapters. It shows vertically the home countries of 
the MNE establishments found in 12 countries and ﬁ  ve industries, and horizontally the 12 host countries. 
The vertical axis displays 37 rows: in 10 rows the companies with a plural country origin have been grouped; 
besides the 27 we traced with single home countries.
The table shows that the main MNE home countries for the ﬁ  ve industries are, in this order, the USA 
(760 of 4,204 establishments, 18%), Germany (616 establishments or 14.5%), France (542 or 13%), and the 
UK (449 or 10.5%). Together, MNEs from these four large countries represent 56% of the MNEs active 
in inward FDI in the 12 countries. FDI from US-based MNEs in the ﬁ  ve industries studied is rather evenly 
spread across host countries, with some concentration on the UK and Germany. According to our database, 
German MNEs have also internationalized broadly, albeit with some concentration on the Netherlands. 
Nearly half of all German MNE establishments (284) can be found in metal and electronics manufacturing. 
The same broad internationalization process holds for UK-based MNEs, though it has to be noted in the 
German and UK cases our data may show some bias in favour of the Netherlands as a host country. UK 
MNEs in ﬁ  nance have a strong presence, and count for over 40% of all UK-based establishments; on the 
other hand, UK metal and electronics and retail MNEs have a weak presence abroad. FDI from French 
MNEs is more evenly spread, both across countries and industries. 
Concerning the smaller home countries, the strong presence of establishments of Swedish MNEs 
across all host countries is remarkable (in total 312 establishments, 7.5%). Two-thirds of all Swedish estab-
lishments (215) stem from metal and electronics manufacturing. The Dutch share is also considerable, with 
259 establishments (6%). This last ﬁ  gure may admittedly be somewhat exaggerated; our knowledge of the 
language, conditions, ﬁ  rms and industries in our home country may have created a positive bias towards the 
Netherlands here. After Italian MNEs (116 establishments, nearly 3%), Finnish FDI plays a substantial role Page ● 37
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too, with 84 establishments, more than half (53) based in metal and electronics manufacturing. According 
to our MNE database, Spanish MNEs play a quite modest role in Europe, with slightly more establishments 
(46 against 43) than the Danish. Spanish FDI is mainly to be found in retail (36 establishments), The FDI 
of Hungarian and Polish origin with respectively 10 and 8 establishments is still quite modest.
Table 2.5   Number of MNE establishments in 12 countries in ﬁ  ve industries, breakdown vertical by MNE 
home country and horizontal by host country
BE DK FI FR DE HU IT NL PL ES SW UK Tot.
Austria  000160121001 1 2
Belgium  4 0 337593 1 1 5235 9 6
Belgium/France 2002000200006




Denmark 2 1 4 1162131174 4 3
Finland  57 1 4 5955754 1 0 8 8 4
Finland/Sweden 0010100100115
France  51 20 20 135 49 26 45 46 32 47 21 49 542
France/Netherl. 0000000100001
Germany  44 37 32 50 131 39 48 61 49 43 41 49 616
Germany/France 000661000304 2 0
HongKong 
(China) 200002072002 1 7
Hungary 110103102001 1 0
India  422761274238 4 9
Ireland 111111111111 1 2
Italy  8 7 61 4 1 072 59 61 06 8 1 1 6
Japan  31 21 24 31 30 24 30 32 23 25 21 29 321
Korea  555555555555 6 0
Luxembourg 210011130301 1 3





Spain 422332253 1 3 24 4 6
Sweden  24 24 26 25 25 20 20 22 22 23 47 24 312
Sweden/Norway 121010011031 1 1
Sweden/ Switz. 444444444444 4 8
Switzerland 8128 1 4 3752517 6 3
Taiwan 0101101101017
Turkey  0000100000001
United Kingdom 32 23 21 34 38 27 27 45 27 32 25 109 449
UK/Turkey 0000200000035
USA  65 56 53 64 78 46 64 62 53 70 68 80 760
Total 388 251 231 447 487 242 317 504 271 328 285 453 4,204
According to our database, 1,285 (30.5%) of all MNE establishments in the 12 countries are owned 
by MNEs from outside the European Union. Apart from the USA they are most notably from Japan (321 
establishments or 8%), and to a lesser extent from Switzerland (63 establishments, if one includes those of Page ● 38
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a Swedish-Swiss ﬁ  rm even 111), Korea (60), India (49) and HongKong/China (17). This ‘outside EU’ share 
is by far largest in metal and electronics manufacturing (46%), followed by the ICT sector (30%), while the 
shares are nearly the same for ﬁ  nance and call centres (17.5%), retail (17%), and transport (16%). A small 
amount of establishments (42, or 1%) are owned by ﬁ  rms from EU member states not belonging to the 12 
under study: 13 from investors from Luxembourg, 12 from both Austria and Ireland, four from Slovakia 
and one from Portugal.
Table 2.5 also shows that the largest numbers of MNE establishments in the database (504 or 12%) are 
located in the Netherlands as host country, even more than establishments in the large countries Germany 
(487 or 11.5%), UK (453, 11%) and France (447, 11%). Again, here we have to acknowledge a certain posi-
tive bias towards the Netherlands. The same mechanism may have played a role in building the Belgian --no-
tably the Flemish-- part of the database: as a home country, Belgium is represented by 388 establishments 
(9%), somewhat more than larger economies such as Spain (328, 8%) and Italy (317, 7.5%).
Next to the establishment level, analyzing the composition of FDI at ﬁ  rm level proves to be fruitful. We 
traced for the ﬁ  ve industries the largest and, in the 12 countries at stake, most internationalized MNEs. We 
combined both yardsticks. As the yardstick for ‘largest’ we used the ranking of their total sales over 2007 
and as the yardstick for ‘most internationalized’ whether they had direct investments in at least three of 12 
countries. Sales data was derived from the top 50 overviews according to worldwide sales ranking that we 
composed for each industry.
We ranked the largest ﬁ  rms according to sales with investments in at least three countries until we 
reached 50 ﬁ  rms. As a result of the use of the “most internationalized’ criterion, some of the world’s largest 
MNEs are missing here. For example, by March 2008 in the 12 countries US-based retail giant Wal-Mart, 
currently the world’s largest proﬁ  t-making company and employer (2,100,000 employees by the end of 
2007) had only invested in the UK, in its Asda subsidiary. Thus, we did not include Wal-Mart. Moreover, it 
is striking that, of the 23 US-based retailers among the retail top 50 list (according to 2007 worldwide sales) 
only two turn out to have activities in at least three of the 12 countries studied. By April 2008 only 21 of 
world’s 50 largest companies in retail according to 2007 sales had invested in three of 12 countries (42%).Page ● 39
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In transport and telecom, with 20 of the world’s 50 largest this share (40%) was even lower. Whilst in the 
ﬁ  nance and call centre industry, just 26 of the world’s 50 largest banks and insurance companies had sub-
stantial interests in at least three of ‘our’ 12 countries (52%). (In 2007, no companies with mainly call centre 
interests had sales ranking them among the world top 50 in ﬁ  nance). By contrast, in March 2008 the world’s 
largest 50 ﬁ  rms in 2007 in metal and electronics manufacturing were all active in three of these countries – 
be it partly under other names or as other legal entities. As a result of mergers, acquisitions and dissolutions 
in the intervening period 37 of these ﬁ  rms (74%) had by then invested in combinations of manufacturing, 
sales, services, and warehousing in at least three countries. Though not fully comparable because of the 
smaller top companies sample, ICT seemed to take a position in between: by March 2008 13 of the world’s 
20 largest ICT companies in 2007 (65%) had direct investments in at least three of the 12 countries.
In metal and electronics, retail and transport and telecom we found 50 MNEs investing in three or 
more of the 12 countries; however, in the ﬁ  nance and call centre industry we found only 38 ﬁ  rms with 
investments in three or more countries, and in ICT 40 ﬁ  rms. Out of the total 228 large and international-
ized MNEs in the ﬁ  ve industries, 160 were based in the 12 countries under study, and 68 (30%) were based 
outside; none of the latter category of MNEs was based in any other EU member states outside of the 12 
under scrutiny here.
The largest share of MNEs in the category from outside the EU was clearly found in metal and elec-
tronics manufacturing: 32 of 50 (64%) ﬁ  rms. ICT ranked second, with 12 MNEs in this category (30% of 
40 ﬁ  rms), followed by ﬁ  nance and call centres (8 of 38, 21%). By contrast, for both the retail industry and 
for transport and telecom the database included 8 MNEs from outside the EU among the 50 largest and 
most internationalized (in both cases 16%). Comparison of these companies to those concerning establish-
ments owned by ‘outside EU’ MNEs shows that both rankings are quite similar.
We continue by investigating concentration within the ranks of the MNEs. First, we go into the shares 
of the largest and most internationalized 50 (respectively 38 and 40) MNEs in the number of total MNE 
establishments, by industry and host country. Table 2.6 shows the results of our exercise.Page ● 40
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Table 2.6  Number of establishments of the largest and most internationalized EU-based MNEs in 12 
countries and ﬁ  ve industries, breakdown vertical by industry and horizontal by host country
BE DK FI FR DE HU IT NL PL ES SW UK Tot
Met& Electr No. comp/home  0 0 1 3 6 0 1 2 0 0 4 1 18
50 / establishm. 79 72 74 81 85 74 76 80 75 76 75 81 928
Tot. establishm. 146 112 118 174 206 111 139 160 120 136 142 171 1735
Share 50 / est. 54 64 63 47 41 67 55 50 63 56 53 47 54
Retail No. comp/home 1 1 0 11 15 0 1 3 0 2 2 6 42
50 / establishm. 45 31 20 48 52 35 33 53 39 35 27 39 457
Tot. establishm. 72 33 22 76 76 40 41 100 48 48 32 51 639
Share 50 / est. 63 94 91 63 68 88 80 53 81 73 84 76 72
Fin & CCs No. comp/home 3 1 0 5 3 0 2 4 0 3 2 7 30
38 / establishm. 52 26 27 53 59 30 42 67 35 51 33 65 540
Tot. establishm. 76 35 38 81 86 40 56 96 44 65 42 100 759
Share 38 / est. 68 74 71 65 69 75 75 70 80 78 79 65 71
ICT No. comp/home 1 1 3 9 4 0 0 3 0 0 1 6 28
40 / establishm. 34 27 23 38 39 17 29 30 20 30 22 40 349
Tot. establishm. 42 29 25 45 52 20 34 50 22 35 29 54 437
Share 40 / est. 81 93 92 84 75 85 85 60 91 86 76 74 80
Trans & Tel No. comp/home 1 1 1 10 6 0 3 4 1 2 4 9 42
50 / establishm. 40 33 24 54 52 30 36 72 32 35 33 60 501
Tot. establishm. 52 42 28 71 67 36 47 93 38 44 40 76 634
Share 50 / est. 77 79 86 76 78 83 77 77 84 80 83 79 79
TOTAL No. comp/home 6 4 5 38 34 0 7 16 1 7 13 29 160
228 / estab.m. 250 189 168 274 287 186 216 302 201 227 205 285 2790
Tot. establishm. 388 251 231 447 479 247 317 499 272 328 285 452 4204
Share 228/ est. 64 75 73 61 60 75 68 61 74 69 72 63 66Page ● 41
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The table reveals interesting information about national market structures, notably about the relation-
ship between the large and most internationalized MNEs and their smaller competitors. It shows that the 
largest, most internationalized MNEs control a considerable share of all MNE establishments; from 54% in 
metal and electronics to 79% in transport and telecom and 80% in ICT. These ﬁ  gures suggest that in most 
countries there is some room for competition and diversiﬁ  cation of interests particularly in the metal and 
electronics trade. Six countries turn out to have above-average concentration outcomes for four or ﬁ  ve in-
dustries: Hungary and Poland for all ﬁ  ve, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Spain for four industries. For the ﬁ  rst 
two countries, this seems to be yet more proof that large MNEs have gained strong positions in CEECs. 
For Finland and Denmark, with their small national markets, the outcome may not be surprising as these 
markets simply may not leave room for many competitors. In all four countries the largest MNEs, besides 
their advantages of technology, scale and marketing, may have also had the advantage of early market entry. 
Although the dominance of large MNEs in Italy and Spain seems more striking, these two country results 
need cautious treatment, as the Italian and Spanish parts of our MNE database may contain relatively few 
establishments of smaller MNEs.
For a second view on concentration within the MNE ranks, we zoom out to the world’s 50 largest ﬁ  rms 
in the four industries for which we compiled such rankings. We calculated the shares of the largest 20 com-
panies in both sales and employment8 ﬁ  gures of the world’s top 50: see Table 2.7.
Table 2.7  50 largest MNEs, total sales in USD mln and employment, and top-20 shares, 2007
sales sales Share top-20 Share top-20 employment employment Share top-20 Share top-20
Metal&electronics 3,241,362 68% 7,917,802 62%
Retail 2,366,880 70% 9,402,273 71%
Finance & CCs 3,844,550 59% 4,770,438 56%
Transport & telec 1,628,640 70% 4,923,996 67%
Within the top 50 ranking, retail and transport and telecom especially prove to be heavily concentrated, 
with the top 20 ﬁ  rms twice taking 70% of total sales and respectively 71% and 56% of total employment. 
Metal and electronics manufacturing is third in this respect, followed on by ﬁ  nance and call centres but even 
here the top 20 ﬁ  rms accounted for 59% of sales and 56% of employment.
8 The  employment  ﬁ  gures, also those in Table 2.9, are just rough estimates. The available sources leave a lot to be desired 
whether employment at ﬁ  rm level is measured in FTEs or head-counts. The ICT industry is not included as we only gathered 
information on the 20 largest MNEs in this industry.Page ● 42
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2.4. The  respondents
Analyses of wages have been performed for 55,111 respondents, divided across countries and industries 
as shown in Table 2.8. It should be noted in the wage tables presented below only cells with more than eight 
respondents are included.
Table 2.8  Number of observations by country and industry, 2007 – 1st half 2008
BE BE FI FI DE DE NL NL PL PL ES ES UK UK Total Total Percent Percent
Metal &  Metal & 
electronics  electronics 
manufacturing  manufacturing 
1,167 952 7,041 5,383 314 541 1,000 16,398 29.8%
Retail Retail 832 438 2,307 4,917 307 804 1,163 10,768 19.5%
Finance & call  Finance & call 
centres centres
828 207 1,581 3,626 559 413 1,304 8,518 15.5%
ICT ICT 1,214 694 1,393 3,292 588 1,329 1,034 9,544 17.3%
Transport and  Transport and 
telecom telecom
855 518 2,186 4,485 284 605 950 9,883 17.9%
Total Total 4,896 2,809 14,508 21,703 2,052 3,692 5,451 55,111 100.0%
Percentage Percentage 8.9% 5.1% 26.3% 39.4% 3.7% 6.7% 9.9% 100.0%
Table 2.9 presents an overview by country and industry of the percentages of respondents who iden-
tiﬁ  ed themselves as working for a MNE. Some 41% of all respondents did so, a substantial share. The 
same results were observable at country level when we weight the data indicating that 59% of respondents 
worked for a domestic ﬁ  rm.
Table 2.9  Percentage of workers in MNEs in total respondents by country and industry
BE BE FI FI DE DE NL NL PL PL ES ES UK UK
Ind.  Ind. 
aver.  aver. 
(unw.) (unw.)
Metal &electronics  Metal &electronics 
manufacturing manufacturing
65 46 56 48 49 44 54 52
Retail Retail 33 21 31 24 32 27 35 29
Finance & call centres Finance & call centres 46 27 39 47 39 33 43 39
ICT ICT 47 45 37 45 35 42 47 43
Transport and telecom Transport and telecom 49 38 45 42 30 33 43 40
Country average  Country average 
(unweighted) (unweighted)
49 36 42 41 37 36 44 41
Across industries, metals and electronics manufacturing show the largest shares of workers in MNE 
establishments, both overall (52% as an unweighted average) and in all seven countries. The largest share 
here as well as across industries can be found in Belgium (65%). The ICT industry shows up with the second 
largest share (43%), followed by transport (40%), ﬁ  nance and call centres (39%), with retailing (29%) bring-Page ● 43
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ing up the rear. The Finnish share of 21% MNE workers in retail is the lowest we found.
For three of seven countries we could also trace the share of those respondents who worked in a for-
eign ﬁ  rm. For Belgium this share is by far the highest, with an unweighted average for the ﬁ  ve industries of 
87%; against 59% for Spain and 55% for the Netherlands. Based on these ﬁ  gures, 42% of all the Belgian 
respondents work for foreign MNEs, with Belgium as host country, and only 7% in home country MNEs; 
this compares with 21% and 15% respectively for Spain, and 23% and 18% for the Netherlands.Page ● 44
M. van Klaveren and K.G. TijdensPage ● 45
Multinationals versus domestic ﬁ  rms
3.  A comparative analysis
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the main ﬁ  ndings of the WIBAR survey. Aggregated data 
are used to compare and contrast key social outcomes of FDI in the ﬁ  ve industries and seven countries we 
studied. We compare between MNE and non-MNE or domestic ﬁ  rms concerning wages, job quality and 
working conditions, including the experience of restructuring and change at the level of the workplace, 
working hours, training, and workplace industrial relations. We return to the debate on the wage differen-
tials between MNEs and domestic ﬁ  rms that we detailed in Chapter 1, and based on our ﬁ  ndings, expand 
this into a more nuanced picture of ‘working in a MNE’. We argue that our evidence paints a picture that 
includes heightened threats of reorganization at workplace level and job insecurity, a less favourable record 
of MNEs as a category with respect to working hours and overtime compensation, and wage pressure in 
some countries exercised by MNEs in low-wage industries. These threats may increasingly counteract the 
‘classical’ advantages of working in a MNE over a domestic ﬁ  rm in the ﬁ  elds of wages, training and internal 
promotion. It will be fascinating to watch in the years to come how the confrontation between advantages 
and disadvantages will shape the labour market position and reputation in society of MNEs versus domes-
tic business in the EU countries – on the one hand under pressure from the obviously growing potential 
for workers’ representation and the quest for corporate social responsibility, and on the other hand the 
international mobility of capital that is likely to continue to escape largely from political, in particular supra-
national, controls.
3.2. Wages  compared
3.2.1.  Comparison of wage levels
Table 3.1a presents an overview of the outcomes of our web-survey for MNEs versus domestic ﬁ  rms 
of gross median hourly wages, for the ﬁ  ve industries and seven countries. The outcomes depict the vari-
ations between national hourly wage levels. Looking at the ﬁ  ve sectors in our survey it can be seen that 
the highest median gross hourly wages in MNEs were, on average, paid in ﬁ  nance and call centres (the 
unweighted average for seven countries was Euro 16.73), followed by the ICT sector (average Euro 16.50) Page ● 46
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and metal and electronics manufacturing (Euro 14.99), with transport and telecom (Euro 12.59) and retail, 
especially, at the low end of the spectrum (Euro 10.33). The rank order of wages by industries in domestic 
ﬁ  rms was somewhat different. Here, ICT took the lead (unweighted average Euro 13.36) followed by ﬁ  -
nance and call centres (Euro 12.46 Euros), but metal and electronics manufacturing (Euro 12.01), transport 
and telecom (Euro 11.45), and retail (Euro 9.31) all showed the same rank order as for MNEs.
Across the seven countries, the highest hourly wages were paid, on average, in Germany (unweighted 
average for ﬁ  ve industries: Euro 16.13), followed by the UK (Euro 15.47), Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Finland all of whom were quite close, with average wages of Euro 14.92, Euro 14.46 and Euro 14.36 re-
spectively. The Spanish average wage was signiﬁ  cantly lower at Euro 8.42. Average wages were, as may have 
been expected, by far lowest in Poland at Euro 5.11. The rank ordering of MNE wages across countries 
remained the same, with Germany on top (Euro 18.74), followed by the UK (Euro 16.82), Belgium (Euro 
16.00), the Netherlands (Euro 15.49), Finland (Euro 15.34), Spain (Euro 9.55) and Poland (Euro 6.42). The 
same held for the ranking of wages in domestic ﬁ  rms. Here the averages for the Northwestern European 
countries were similar, ranging from Euro 14.35 for Germany, through Euro 14.11 for the UK, Euro 13.81 
for Belgium, Euro 13.75 for the Netherlands, to Euro 13.71 for Finland. By contrast, the domestic ﬁ  rm 
average wage for Spain was Euro 7.75, and that for Poland Euro 4.66.
The standard deviations calculated as a measure for the dispersion of wages within countries and in-
dustries, showed striking resemblances. In all ten cases we found for both MNEs and non-MNEs relatively 
high standard deviations for the UK, in nine cases for Belgium and Spain, and in eight cases for Poland, The 
exceptions were lower standard deviations for MNEs in Belgian and Polish ICT, for the Spanish domestic 
ﬁ  nance and call centre industry and for the Polish domestic transport industry. By contrast, for Finland, 
Germany and the Netherlands we came across relatively low standard deviations, and thus lower wage dis-
persion. The only exception across industries was retailing; here, also standard deviations were considerable 
for both German and Dutch MNEs and domestic ﬁ  rms, but only for MNEs in Finland (with the exception 
of Finnish domestic retailing). This division of wage dispersion was only partially consistent with the over-
all income inequality in this seven countries’ group. Measured in the mid-2000s through the Gini coefﬁ  cient, 
the UK indeed showed a more unequal income distribution than the other countries, but the Gini ratios for 
Spain and Poland were about equal the ratio for the Netherlands, whereas Belgium according to this yard-Page ● 47
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stick had the lowest income inequality (UNDP, 2007, Table 15)9.
9  Along another yardstick, indicating only wage inequality and measuring the distance in wages between the top 10% of  workers (D9) and 
the 10% at the bottom of  the distribution (D1), thus D9/D1, and using 2001-2006 data, UK was still the country with the largest inequality, 
followed by Spain, with Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium mutually close, and Finland least unequal. No ﬁ  gures were available for Poland 
(ILO, 2010, Table SA3). Yet, the conclusion in our text holds.Page ● 48
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Table 3.1a  Median gross hourly wages in Euros by country and industry
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics 
MNE 16.37 16.01 20.48 17.61 6.47 10.55 17.46
No MNE 14.18 14.43 15.06 14.02 4.24 8.07 14.08
Total 15.54 15.12 17.98 15.40 5.01 8.88 16.09
Retail
MNE 12.81 13.20 12.32 10.40 4.85 6.07 12.66
No MNE 12.09 13.23 10.00 10.03 3.70 5.39 10.75
Total 12.60 13.22 10.78 10.16 3.90 5.55 11.53
Finance & call centres
MNE 19.11 15.01 23.09 17.49 6.35 12.19 17.54
No MNE 14.04 12.68 18.00 14.88 4.85 9.12 14.20
Total 16.23 13.25 20.02 16.14 5.34 10.39 15.96
ICT
MNE 17.28 18.67 20.65 18.60 8.66 10.39 21.28
No MNE 14.34 15.40 15.64 17.32 6.06 8.66 16.11
Total 15.80 16.98 17.32 17.78 6.50 9.24 18.48
Transport & telecom
MNE 14.43 13.68 17.18 13.36 5.77 8.54 15.20
No MNE 14.41 12.82 13.03 12.50 4.46 7.53 15.43
Total 14.43 13.21 14.56 12.83 4.79 8.04 15.29
Table 3.1b shows the ranking of wages by industry and country, using unweighted averages (=100) per 
column (=country). Regarding the ﬁ  ve industries, Belgium and Finland showed by far the ﬂ  attest wage struc-
tures by industry and within the MNE and domestic ﬁ  rm ranks, recorded differences between the best and 
the worst paying industries of about 30%. Poland, by industry, had the most dispersed wage structure, with 
an overall difference of 57%, closely followed by Spain (56%). It was striking that, while the wage index 
for Polish MNEs in ICT was 169, the same ﬁ  gure for domestic retail in Poland stood at just 64. Within the 
MNE ranks, the largest wage difference could be traced to Spain, but within the ranks of the domestic ﬁ  rms 
the largest difference showed up in the Netherlands.
Looking at MNEs we can see that the ICT sector was the top payer in four countries: Finland, the Neth-
erlands, Poland (very clearly!), and the UK. Finance and call centres took the lead in Belgium and Germany, 
and were in second position in the UK, but only third in Finland, the Netherlands and Poland. In these 
three countries metal and electronics manufacturing ranked second. Compared with the ranking for MNE 
wages, wages in domestic ﬁ  rms showed some remarkable differences. For example, in Belgium transport 
and telecom got the highest ranking, and ﬁ  nance and call centres were ranked only fourth. In Finland the 
ﬁ  nance and call centre industry was ranked lowest, even lower than transport and telecom and retail. Among 
the British domestic sectors, transport and telecom ranked second and metal and electronics manufacturing Page ● 49
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only fourth. In Germany, the industry rankings were exactly the same for MNEs and domestic ﬁ  rms, while 
in the Netherlands, Poland and Spain they showed only minor differences.
Table 3.1b  Median gross hourly wages by country and industry, unweighted average per column (total) = 
100
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics 
MNE 110 111 127 122 127 125 113
No MNE 95 100 93 97 83 96 91
Retail
MNE 86 92 76 72 95 72 82
No MNE 81 92 67 69 72 64 69
Finance & call centres
MNE 117 105 143 121 124 145 113
No MNE 94 88 112 103 95 108 92
ICT
MNE 116 130 128 129 169 123 138
No MNE 96 107 97 120 119 103 104
Transport & telecom
MNE 97 95 107 92 113 101 98
No MNE 97 89 81 86 87 89 100
Table 3.1c shows the ranking of wages for MNEs and non-MNEs (unweighted averages (=100) per 
row (=industry / MNE and non-MNE) by industries for the countries studied. We have to emphasize that 
this wage comparison does not by any means imply a purchasing power comparison. For MNEs, in three 
industries: metal and electronics manufacturing, ﬁ  nance and call centres, and transport and telecom we can 
see that the highest median hourly wages were paid in Germany. The UK had the highest hourly wages in 
ICT and retail. Among the median wages paid by the non-MNEs, German wages again ranked top in metal 
and electronics manufacturing as well as in ﬁ  nance and call centres, but in transport and telecom UK wages 
were the highest. In the ICT sector Dutch domestic ﬁ  rms showed the highest wages and in retail this was 
clearly the case for Finnish domestic ﬁ  rms. In all the rankings shown in this table Spanish and Polish wages 
ended up in sixth and seventh position.Page ● 50
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Table 3.1c  Median gross hourly wages by country and industry, unweighted average per row = 100
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics 
MNE 109 107 137 117 43 70 116
No MNE 118 120 126 117 35 67 117
Retail
MNE 124 128 119 101 47 59 123
No MNE 130 142 107 108 40 58 115
Finance & call centres
MNE 121 95 146 110 40 77 111
No MNE 112 101 144 119 39 73 113
ICT
MNE 105 113 125 113 52 63 129
No MNE 108 115 117 130 45 65 121
Transport & telecom
MNE 115 109 136 106 46 68 121
No MNE 126 102 103 99 39 66 135
Table 3.1d provides further analysis of the levels of wages paid in MNEs and non-MNEs, showing in 
particular the differences between median gross hourly wages paid expressed as a percentage of the MNE 
wage. The data shows that MNEs paid a wage premium over domestic ﬁ  rms nearly everywhere in our study. 
The only two exceptions were Finnish retail, where median wages in domestic ﬁ  rms were 0.3% higher than 
in MNEs, and UK transport and telecom, where domestic ﬁ  rms paid 1.5% more. Across the ﬁ  ve industries 
and seven countries researched the wage premium was highest in metal and electronics manufacturing (an 
unweighted average of 21.1%), closely followed by ﬁ  nance and call centres (21.0%) and by the ICT industry 
(19.5%). The retail industry wage premium was lower at 11.1%, and the premium was lowest in transport 
and telecom at 9.9%. Thus, the MNE wage premium was considerably smaller in the two low-wage indus-
tries. Again, using unweighted averages, Poland showed the largest country differences between MNE and 
non-MNE wages (26.8%), followed by Germany (23.2%). Three countries, Spain (17.7%), the UK (15.3%) 
and Belgium (12.5%), made up a middle group, and wage premia were on average the smallest in the Neth-
erlands (10.4%) and Finland (9.5%). The largest wage differentials per country and industry were found in 
Polish metal and electronics manufacturing (34.5%), followed by ICT in Poland (30.0%), metal and electron-
ics in Germany and ﬁ  nance and call centres in Belgium both at 26.5%.Page ● 51
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Table 3.1d  Differences between median gross hourly wages in MNEs and non-MNEs, by country and in-
dustry
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK Ind. 
aver. 
(unw.)
Metal & electronics  13.4% 9.9% 26.5% 20.4% 34.5% 23.5% 19.4% 21.1%
Retail 5.6% -0.3% 18.8% 3.5% 23.7% 11.2% 15.1% 11.1%
Finance & call centres 26.5% 15.5% 22.0% 14.9% 23.6% 25.2% 19.0% 21.0%
ICT 17.0% 17.5% 24.3% 6.9% 30.0% 16.7% 24.3% 19.5%
Transport & telecom 0.1% 6.1% 24.2% 6.4% 22.0% 11.8% -1.5% 9.9%
Country average (unw.) 12.5% 9.7% 23.2% 10.4% 26.8% 17.7% 15.3% 16.5%
Taking establishment size into account, the wage premium in MNEs was still more or less dominant 
but to a lesser extent. Table 3.1e shows the wage differences for the three size categories we used. In 77 of 
98 possible cases (there are seven empty cells), median gross hourly wages were larger in MNEs while in 
21 cases they were larger in non-MNEs. Most exceptions from the ‘MNE premium rule’ could be found in 
the medium-sized category (ten), followed by the large establishments with eight and the small establish-
ment category with only three exceptions. As for countries, Germany did not reveal any exceptions from 
the ‘MNE premium rule’, the Netherlands and Poland showed two exceptions, Spain three, the UK and 
Belgium four (but Belgium from 11 instead of 15 cases), leaving Finland on top with six exceptions. 
Table 3.1 e Differences between median gross hourly wages of workers in MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms, by 
country, industry and ﬁ  rm size
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics
Difference MNE-non-MNE < 100 empl 13.2% 11.2% 19.3% 12.6% 22.4% 12.9% 19.3%
Difference MNE-non-MNE 100-500 empl 0.5% 5.0% 7.7% 5.5% 37.5% 20.8% 7.7%
Difference MNE-non-MNE > 500 empl - -11.6% 9.4% 23.6% 20.0% 28.1% 9.1%
Retail
Difference MNE-non-MNE < 100 empl 5.2% -7.6% 14.6% 0.5% 20.8% 4.9% 15.4%
Difference MNE-non-MNE 100-500 empl -0.2% 7.0% 11.7% 11.8% 8.1% 35.9% -4.0%
Difference MNE-non-MNE > 500 empl - - 20.2% -2.2% - - 0.3%
Finance & call centres
Difference MNE-non-MNE < 100 empl 11.6% 8.7% 18.0% 14.6% 28.6% 29.5% -0.3%
Difference MNE-non-MNE 100-500 empl - -3.4% 11.6% 5.5% -10.1% -3.6% 8.1%
Difference MNE-non-MNE > 500 empl -15.4% 37.1% 19.5% 6.3% 4.4% 20.5% 17.2%
ICT
Difference MNE-non-MNE < 100 empl 11.6% 8.7% 18.0% 14.6% 28.6% 29.5% -0.3%
Difference MNE-non-MNE 100-500 empl - -3.4% 11.6% 5.5% -10.1% -3.6% 8.1%
Difference MNE-non-MNE > 500 empl -15.4% 37.1% 19.5% 6.3% 4.4% 20.5% 17.2%
Transport & telecom
Difference MNE-non-MNE < 100 empl 0.1% 8.3% 25.1% 4.8% 29.2% 26.0% 15.4%
Difference MNE-non-MNE 100-500 empl 3.1% -7.3% 10.4% 8.0% 2.2% 5.5% -13.6%
Difference MNE-non-MNE > 500 empl -3.5% -14.7% 21.7% -0.2% 35.1% -25.2% -13.0%Page ● 52
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As for industries, most exceptions (seven) were found in transport and telecom, among which were 
some notable examples, for instance, a 25% wage gap in favour of Spanish domestic ﬁ  rms with 500 or more 
employees. The ICT sector exhibited ﬁ  ve exceptions, ﬁ  nance and call centers and retail both four. Metal 
and electronics manufacturing showed the most consistent picture in favour of MNE wages, with only one 
exception to the rule. 
We devoted special attention to the gender pay gap, deﬁ  ned as the difference between the median male 
and female gross hourly wages expressed as a percentage of the median male wage. Table 3.1f shows that in 
22 of 35 cases the gender pay gap was larger in MNEs than in domestic companies. In one case there was 
no difference and in 12 cases the wage position of women in domestic ﬁ  rms was more disadvantaged. This 
was particularly true for ﬁ  nance and call centres, in four of seven countries, and in the ICT industry and the 
transport and telecom sectors, both in three of our seven countries. At the country level the smaller gender 
pay gap in domestic ﬁ  rms showed in three of the ﬁ  ve industries, for two industries in Finland and Poland, 
and in one each for the Netherlands and the UK. In Spain, by contrast, MNEs showed a consistently larger 
gap.
Table 3.1f  Differences between median gross hourly wages of male and female workers in MNE and non-
MNE ﬁ  rms, by country and industry
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics
MNE difference m-f 18.3% 17.8% 14.3% 19.4% 8.9% 30.5% 23.2%
No MNE difference m-f 6.6% 8.0% 16.7% 19.4% 1.2% 19.6% 20.3%
Difference in %-pts 11.7% 9.8% -2.4% 0.0% 7.7% 10.9% 2.9%
Retail
MNE difference m-f 1.1% 12.7% 16.1% 22.2% 36.0% 17.6% 23.8%
No MNE difference m-f 12.6% -0.9% 14.8% 15.4% 29.7% 8.6% 13.8%
Difference in %-pts -11.5% 13.6% 1.3% 6.8% 6.3% 9.0% 10.0%
Finance & call c.
MNE difference m-f 33.7% 29.1% 18.4% 25.3% 10.9% 34.6% 16.4%
No MNE difference m-f 27.2% 10.5% 23.8% 30.6% 25.0% 31.6% 17.0%
Difference in %-pts 6.5% 18.6% -5.4% -5.3% -14.1% 3.0% -0.6%
ICT
MNE difference m-f -11.1% 8.8% 14.4% 17.7% 36.5% 24.5% 22.4%
No MNE difference m-f 2.9% 10.7% 22.4% 17.1% 33.3% 15.7% 8.5%
Difference in %-pts -14.0% -1.9% -8.0% 0.6% 3.2% 8.8% 13.9%
Transport & telec.
MNE difference m-f 12.3% 3.5% 2.7% 15.2% -3.5% 23.7% 8.3%
No MNE difference m-f 21.7% 7.4% 1.0% 5.3% 0.0% 17.5% 4.9%
Difference in %-pts -9.4% -3.9% 1.7% 9.9% -3.5% 6.2% 3.4%
In Table 3.2 we present an overview of the results of our regression analysis for the ﬁ  ve industries and 
seven countries, with the statistically signiﬁ  cant differences printed in bold. As indicated, in this analysis we 
controlled for the inﬂ  uence of ﬁ  ve factors: work experience, gender, working hours, education, and ﬁ  rm 
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partly too they differ. The rather low to negative MNE premia found for Finland conﬁ  rmed recent evidence 
on wage differentials in the Nordic countries. Obviously, in this respect Belgium –with the exception of its 
metal and electronics manufacturing— could be included in this country category as well, as could the Neth-
erlands, although a bit less convincingly perhaps. However, our ﬁ  ndings for Germany showed considerable 
MNE premia in all industries, and this was clearly in contradiction to other recent evidence for this country 
(though in line with older evidence). The results for Poland, except those for the retail industry, showed 
large MNE premia which underlined the conclusion that wage premia in CEECs might remain substantial 
for some time yet. Again, also with the exception of retail, the Spanish outcomes could be interpreted as a 
conﬁ  rmation of what we noted in Chapter 1 about the MNE premium in transition economies. The UK 
ﬁ  gures, at least in part, seemed to conﬁ  rm a falling trend of MNE premia in high-income countries with 
ﬂ  exible labour markets. The transport and telecom industry was a clear exception here.
By going into the industry outcomes of our regression analysis in greater detail we hope to trace ex-
planations linked to the dynamics of competition, labour markets and industrial relations at industry level. 
Table 3.2 shows that, controlled for the ﬁ  ve factors just mentioned, in ﬁ  ve combinations of countries and 
industries domestic ﬁ  rms were better payers than comparable MNEs: in ﬁ  nance and call centres, ICT and 
transport and telecom in Belgium; in metal and electronics manufacturing in Finland, and in transport and 
telecom in the UK. In six combinations remuneration in MNEs and non-MNEs was rather close, with the 
MNE wage premium less than 5%: in Belgian retail, in Finnish retail and transport and telecom, in Dutch 
retail and ICT, and in Spanish retail. With four cases, retail went on top of these 11 industries with a nega-
tive or a low MNE wage premium, followed by transport and telecom (three cases), ICT (two), and metal 
and electronics and ﬁ  nance and call centres (each one). If we return to the relative wages and the wage 
dispersion by industry discussed earlier as well as to more detailed, national evidence on the functioning of 
industries, then two explanations seem relevant. First, domestic ﬁ  rms as a category may have succeeded in 
developing or maintaining strong positions in factor markets, including in the labour market. This was likely 
the case in Belgium in retail, in ﬁ  nance and call centres and in ICT, in Finland in metal and electronics and 
in retail, and in the Netherlands in ICT. A second explanation for a small wage gap between MNEs and 
non-MNES may be that MNEs may have lost positions in certain industries and countries, and (related to 
these developments or as deliberate policies) have kept wages relatively low. This is mostly to be expected 
in the low-wage industries retail and transport and telecom. We indeed found indications that MNEs active 
in Spanish and Polish retail as well as in Belgian, Spanish and UK transport and telecom had resorted to Page ● 54
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outright wage pressure. When discussing drafts of our reporting, trade union ofﬁ  cials from Spain and the 
UK offered support for this assertion. Our results deserve to be confronted with further analyses of speciﬁ  c 
HRM practices in certain MNEs. Similarly, the relationship with the industrial relations context deserves 
closer scrutiny too. Of course, in some countries and industries the two explanations may combine, where 
relatively strong domestic ﬁ  rms and ‘weak’ (or miserly) MNEs prevailed, as seems to have been the case in 
Finnish retail and transport and telecom as well as in Dutch retail.
Table 3.2  Hourly MNE wage premia ((MNE – non-MNE): MNE x 100) after control for ﬁ  ve factors, by 
country and industry
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics manuf. 15.2% -0.2% 12.5% 9.9% 37.5% 17.7% 14.1%
Retail 1.5% 0.2% 14.1% 4.5% 7.0% 3.7% 9.8%
Finance and call centres -2.7% 7.9% 15.5% 8.3% 18.7% 27.4% 8.8%
ICT -3.7% 7.3% 17.2% 3.9% 28.8% 11.7% 17.9%
Transport and telecom -14.2% 2.4% 16.1% 6.7% 24.3% 16.5% -1.1%
In pursuit of a more complete explanation of the wage differentials between MNEs and non-MNEs, 
beyond the model that we tested statistically, we will now compare our industry outcomes on aspects of pay; 
job quality and working conditions; training, and workplace industrial relations.
3.2.2.  Overtime compensation compared
Table 3.3 shows the percentages of respondents working more hours than agreed and receiving over-
time compensation in MNE and domestic ﬁ  rms, by country and industry. In 25 out of 35 cases the propor-
tion of respondents who received overtime compensation was lower in MNEs compared to their colleagues 
in domestic ﬁ  rms. In one case MNEs and non-MNEs were on a par, in nine cases workers in non-MNEs 
received overtime compensation less frequently. In the transport and telecom sector MNEs paid overtime 
compensation less frequently in all seven countries. In metal and electronics manufacturing this was the case 
in six countries (the exception being Poland), in retail in ﬁ  ve countries and in ICT in four. Only in ﬁ  nance 
and call centres in a minority of cases i.e. in three countries, did we ﬁ  nd that MNEs paid overtime less fre-
quently. As for countries, in the Netherlands and the UK MNEs consistently paid compensation for over-
time less frequently than was the case for non-MNEs; in Germany and Spain this was so in four industries, 
in Belgium in three, and in Finland and Poland in only two industries.
On the other hand, the practice of working overtime (as opposed to being paid for overtime) appeared 
to be considerably more widespread in MNEs than in domestic ﬁ  rms. We found this in 30 of 35 cases, 
with two exceptions in transport and telecom and one each in ﬁ  nance and call centres, ICT, and retail. If 
we conﬂ  ate these ﬁ  ndings with those on overtime compensation, it means that the MNE wage premium Page ● 55
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calculated over weekly or monthly wages for signiﬁ  cant groups of workers in MNE establishments may be 
smaller than that presented earlier for hourly wages. This held true if the difference between the percentages 
receiving overtime compensation was less than that of the percentages working overtime. We found this for 
26 out of 35 cases. Exceptions were Spanish transport and telecom, where workers in MNEs received 4% 
less overtime compensation but also worked 16% less overtime, and Belgian ICT, where workers in MNEs 
received 5% more overtime compensation and worked 4% more overtime. 
Table 3.3  Differences between percentage of workers receiving overtime compensation and working 
usually more hours than agreed in MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms (%-points), by country and indus-
try
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Combining the results concerning overtime pay and hours worked revealed that the largest differences 
between hourly and weekly/monthly wages showed in the retail industry. Following this reasoning, we 
calculated that in Dutch retail the average weekly differential between MNEs and domestic ﬁ  rms would 
decrease 2%-points compared to the hourly difference; in Finnish retail the decrease would be 0.8%-pts, and 
in retailing in Belgium, Germany, Poland, Spain and the UK the decrease would be between 0.2-0.3%-pts. Page ● 56
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The same phenomenon could be observed in the other industries, but here the weekly wage differentials 
remained consistently less than 1.2%-points lower than the hourly differentials.10
3.2.3.  Performance-based pay compared
Table 3.4 provides an overview for the differences between the percentages of respondents who re-
ceived performance-based pay in MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms, by country (except for Poland, where the 
related question was not posed in the survey) and industry. The table shows that in 90% of the cases (27 of 
30) the incidence of performance-based pay was higher in MNEs than in domestic ﬁ  rms. Exceptions were 
the Finnish and German ﬁ  nance and call centres as well as Finnish ICT. 
Table 3.4  Differences between percentage of workers receiving performance-based pay in MNE and 
non-MNE ﬁ  rms (%-points), by country and industry
BE FI DE NL ES UK
Metal & electronics
receiving perform.-based pay difference MNE-non-MNE 9% 4% 7% 6% 3% 3%
Retail
receiving perform.-based pay difference MNE-non-MNE 3% 3% 6% 6% 14% 3%
Finance & call c.
receiving perform.-based pay difference MNE-non-MNE 11% -15% -7% 8% 6% 3%
ICT
receiving perform.-based pay difference MNE-non-MNE 11% -2% 2% 6% 1% 0%
Transport & telec.
receiving perform.-based pay difference MNE-non-MNE 1% 2% 3% 1% 8% 3%
3.3.  Job quality and working conditions compared
Our research covered six issues under this heading, namely, working in dangerous conditions; the in-
cidence of work-related stress; whether the job level matched the educational level of the worker; internal 
promotion (career opportunities); the incidence of reorganizations, and ﬁ  nally job satisfaction and job 
security. 
Concerning the perception of working in dangerous conditions, we gathered data from four countries, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. In ten out of 20 cases the respondents in domestic ﬁ  rms had 
a more negative perception in this respect, in ﬁ  ve cases they perceived working in an MNE as more dan-
gerous, and in ﬁ  ve cases there was no difference. As could be expected, work in the transport and telecom 
10  We refrained from calculating wage differentials between MNEs and non-MNEs on a weekly basis, including a regression 
analysis, due to the complex calculations needed and due to the fact that the differences between hourly and weekly wage 
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industry was perceived as relatively most dangerous, followed by that in metal and electronics manufactur-
ing. In transport and telecom work in domestic ﬁ  rms was perceived as more dangerous in all four countries, 
with in Belgium, Poland and Spain a large difference with the scores for MNEs. Over-all, compliance with 
safety standards in the European countries and industries at stake was regarded as (slightly) better in MNEs 
than in non-MNEs.Page ● 58
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Concerning the incidence of work-related stress, we gathered information for ﬁ  ve countries: Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Table 3.5 shows the differences between scores on the four 
indicators of perceived work-stress we used, in MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms. The reader should keep in mind 
that a negative sign indicates a lower stress level in MNEs and a higher level in non-MNEs. First, it has to 
be noted that the differences were mostly small, or non-existent: a ‘0’ indicating no difference showed up 
in 30 of 100 cases. Substantial differences could mainly be found for Germany, notably in transport and 
telecom and ICT. The outcomes concerning three indicators, ‘ﬁ  nds job stressful’, ‘work mentally exhausting’ 
and ‘ﬁ  nds job boring’, pointed in the direction of higher stress levels in MNEs, though they were not very 
convincing. Out of 25 cases, ‘ﬁ  nds job stressful’ was at a higher level for MNEs 11 times, was at a lower 
level four times and showed no difference 10 times. For ‘work mentally exhausting’ these ﬁ  gures were 13, 
four and eight respectively, and for ‘ﬁ  nds job boring’ 11, six and eight respectively. The ‘ﬁ  nds job boring’ 
outcomes were especially industry-speciﬁ  c: note for example that in four out of ﬁ  ve cases in ﬁ  nance and 
call centres the perceived stress-levels were higher in MNEs, while in four cases in transport and telecom 
they were lower. By contrast the outcomes for the fourth work-stress indicator, ‘Work physically exhausting’, 
pointed to slightly higher stress levels in domestic ﬁ  rms, with a higher score showing 12 times in non-MNEs 
compared to nine times in MNEs and with no difference showing eight times. In transport and telecom 
physically exhausting work consistently scored higher in domestic ﬁ  rms, while in retail the results were either 
on a par or indicated a higher perceived level in MNEs. As for countries, Spain showed the most of such 
outcomes with higher perceived work-stress: that was indicated nine times for domestic ﬁ  rms. This was 
followed by Poland (ﬁ  ve times, of which three were in ﬁ  nance and call centres), Belgium (four), Germany 
(four, of which three were in transport and telecom), and the Netherlands (four).
The third job quality issue was that concerning the possible gap between the level of the job performed 
and the educational level of a worker. We could use data comparing MNEs and non-MNEs for four coun-
tries: Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Over-all, the ‘match’ levels were higher in MNEs: that 
was so in 13 of 20 cases, whereas in six cases domestic ﬁ  rms showed higher levels and in one case they were 
on a par. The picture varied across industries. In transport and telecom all ﬁ  ve countries showed higher 
levels for MNEs, and in metal and electronics four countries did, with one on a par. By contrast, both retail 
and ﬁ  nance and call centres in three cases showed higher scores for domestic ﬁ  rms, in the cases of Dutch 
and Spanish retail even quite substantially. As for countries, Poland (four positive, one equal) showed the 
most positive picture for MNEs, followed by the Netherlands (four positive, one negative), while Spain with
three higher match levels for domestic ﬁ  rms had the most positive outcome for the latter.Page ● 59
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Table 3.5  Differences between scores on work-stress related issues in MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms (%-points), 
by country and industry
BE DE NL PL ES
Metal & electronics
Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0.1 0 0.1 0 0
Work physically exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE 0 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.3
Work mentally exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE 0 0 -0.1 0.2 -0.2
Finds job boring difference MNE-non-MNE 0 0 0 0.1 0.1
Retail
Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0.2 0.2 0.3 0 0.2
Work physically exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE 0 0 0.1 0.2 0
Work mentally exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1
Finds job boring difference MNE-non-MNE -0.1 0 0 0.2 -0.1
Finance & call centres
Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0 0 0 -0.1 -0.1
Work physically exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Work mentally exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE 0 1.0 0.2 -0.3 0.1
Finds job boring difference MNE-non-MNE 0 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.3
ICT
Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Work physically exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE -0.1 2.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1
Work mentally exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE 0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0
Finds job boring difference MNE-non-MNE 0 1.5 0 0.3 0.1
Transport & telecom
Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0 -0.2 0.2 0 -0.3
Work physically exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE -0.3 -0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
Work mentally exhausting difference MNE-non-MNE 0.1 0.4 0 0 0
Finds job boring difference MNE-non-MNE -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1Page ● 60
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The fourth job quality issue concerned internal promotion or careering. Table 3.6 shows the differences 
between MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms concerning respondents who reported having been promoted in their 
current ﬁ  rm. The share of those who reported having been promoted was overwhelmingly higher in MNEs 
than in domestic ﬁ  rms. There were only two exceptions in 35 cases, namely, Polish metal and electronics 
manufacturing and Finnish transport and telecom. As for industries, the largest differences between MNEs 
and non-MNEs could be traced in ﬁ  nance and call centres (unweighted average 12.6%-points), followed 
by ICT (12.0%-pts), transport and telecom (9.0), retail (8.9), and metal and electronics (7.6). As for coun-
tries, the largest differences between MNEs and non-MNEs showed for Belgium (unweighted average 
15.4%-points), followed by the UK (12.4%-pts), Germany (12.8), the Netherlands (11.2), Spain (7.6), and 
Finland (6.6). With 4.0%-points, the difference was clearly the smallest for Poland.
Table 3.6  Differences in percentages of workers reporting to have been promoted in the current ﬁ  rm, in 
MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms (%-points), by country and industry
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics
Has been promoted 
in current ﬁ  rm
difference MNE-non-
MNE
17% 9% 10% 11% -5% 2% 9%
Retail
Has been promoted 
in current ﬁ  rm
difference MNE-non-
MNE
14% 4% 18% 8% 2% 4% 12%
Finance & call 
centers
Has been promoted 
in current ﬁ  rm
difference MNE-non-
MNE
17% 14% 9% 13% 11% 9% 15%
ICT
Has been promoted 
in current ﬁ  rm
difference MNE-non-
MNE
14% 11% 14% 12% 9% 5% 19%
Transport & 
telecom
Has been promoted 
in current ﬁ  rm
difference MNE-non-
MNE
15% -5% 13% 12% 3% 18% 7%
The ﬁ  fth job quality issue was that concerning experiences with the incidence of reorganisation and 
respondents’ expectations of future reorganisation. Table 3.7 shows the differences in the percentages of 
respondents who reported that they had experienced (at least one) reorganisation in the previous year and 
the percentages who expected a reorganisation in the forthcoming 12 months. Unfortunately we gathered 
data on these subjects for only ﬁ  ve countries. Concerning those respondents who experienced reorganiza-
tion the evidence was again clear and consistent: workers in MNEs reporting more often than their col-
leagues in domestic ﬁ  rms that ‘their’ organisation had faced a reorganisation in the previous year. The only 
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differences between the outcomes for both categories could be found in the ICT industry (unweighted 
average 18.0%-points), followed by metal and electronics manufacturing (16.6%-pts) and ﬁ  nance and call 
centres (13.4), whereas the differences were much smaller in transport and telecom (9.6) and especially so in 
the retail industry (3.2). Germany seemed to be the most ‘reorganisation-prone’ country (unweighted aver-
age 14.4%-points), but the differences with Poland (13.3), the UK (12.6) and the Netherlands (12.4) were 
rather small.
Looking at expected reorganisation, the evidence albeit from only four countries was unequivocal: in all 
20 cases workers in MNEs reported more expectation of a reorganisation in the forthcoming 12 months 
than respondents who worked in domestic ﬁ  rms. The differences in outcomes hardly varied across indus-
tries: ICT scored an unweighted average of 14.3%-points, metal and electronics 11.8, retail 11.3, and ﬁ  nance 
and call centers as well as transport and telecom both 11.0. As for countries, the differences were larger, with 
Germany at the top (unweighted average: 17.8%-points), followed by Belgium (13.6), the UK (11.6), and 
Poland (4.4). Of course, it is interesting to probe a little deeper into the outcomes concerning experienced 
and expected reorganisations. In Belgium and Germany the differences between MNEs and domestic ﬁ  rms 
concerning expected reorganisations were larger than the differences concerning previous reorganisations 
for all ﬁ  ve industries. Comparatively, respondents in MNEs in the UK and in Poland seemed more optimis-
tic. In the UK such a growing difference was found for two industries, in Poland for only one. Compared to 
the outcomes on previous reorganisations, the differences in scores between MNEs and non-MNEs for the 
various industries on expected reorganisations came much closer. Respondents in MNEs in transport and 
telecom and in retail expected to be confronted with reorganisations much more often than their colleagues 
in domestic ﬁ  rms; especially in retail this contrasted with the MNE : non-MNE difference in experienced 
reorganisation.Page ● 62
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Table 3.7  Differences between percentages reporting that organization faced reorganisation, and per-
centages reporting to expect a reorganisation in the next 12 months, in MNE and non-MNE 
ﬁ  rms (%-points), by country and industry
BE DE NL PL UK
Metal & electronics
Organisation faced reorganisation difference MNE-non-MNE 15% 14% 12% 30% 12%
Reorganisation expected in 12 m. difference MNE-non-MNE 16% 18% - 5% 8%
Retail
Organisation faced reorganisation difference MNE-non-MNE 0% 8% 4% -6% 10%
Reorganisation expected in 12 m. difference MNE-non-MNE 17% 9% - 6% 13%
Finance & call centres
Organisation faced reorganisation difference MNE-non-MNE 15% 11% 20% 12% 9%
Reorganisation expected in 12 m. difference MNE-non-MNE 19% 15% - 3% 7%
ICT
Organisation faced reorganisation difference MNE-non-MNE 12% 18% 17% 21% 22%
Reorganisation expected in 12 m. difference MNE-non-MNE 13% 21% - 6% 17%
Transport & telecom
Organisation faced reorganisation difference MNE-non-MNE 0% 21% 9% 8% 10%
Reorganisation expected in 12 m. difference MNE-non-MNE 3% 26% - 2% 13%
Our last issue related to job quality concerned job satisfaction, that we also relate to job security. Table 
3.8 shows the differences between the scores on job satisfaction in MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms, by country 
and industry. In just 18 out of 35 cases, in other words the smallest majority, satisfaction scores for MNEs 
were higher, though in most cases the differences were small. Non-MNEs showed a higher score six times, 
and the results for MNE and non-MNEs were on a par in 11 cases. Metal and electronics manufacturing 
showed the highest scores for MNEs, followed by transport and telecom, retail, ﬁ  nance and call centres, and 
ﬁ  nally ICT. As for countries, respondents working for MNEs in Spain revealed the highest job satisfaction 
scores, and those in Finland and Poland were the lowest.Page ● 63
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Table 3.8  Differences between scores on job satisfaction, ranging from 1=Not satisﬁ  ed to 5= Satisﬁ  ed, in 
MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms (%-points), by country and industry
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics
Satisfaction with job difference MNE-non-
MNE
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1
Retail
Satisfaction with job difference MNE-non-
MNE
0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.1 -0.1
Finance & call 
centers
Satisfaction with job difference MNE-non-
MNE
0 -0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0
ICT
Satisfaction with job difference MNE-non-
MNE
0 -0.1 0 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0
Transport & telecom
Satisfaction with job difference MNE-non-
MNE
0.1 0 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.1
We add here the outcomes concerning job security, though those only covered Germany, the Nether-
lands and Poland. In the ﬁ  rst two countries the scores on job security were equal for MNEs and non-MNEs 
(in two cases in Germany and three in the Netherlands), a single case had a slightly higher job security in 
MNEs (0.1%-point in German transport and telecom) and four cases showed a slightly lower score for 
MNEs (0.1%-point twice in the retail industry, in German metal and electronics and in Dutch transport 
and telecom). The outcomes for Poland were more extreme. Though in that country job security in metal 
and electronics MNEs was valued slightly (0.1%-point) higher than in domestic ﬁ  rms, the scores for MNEs 
were clearly lower in the other four industries, up to 0.5%-pts lower in Polish transport and telecom. The 
latter outcomes were also remarkable if we take the Polish job satisfaction outcomes into consideration. 
They were much more positive for the MNEs. In three Polish industries the MNEs’ scores for job security 
were, compared with those for non-MNEs, 0.4%-pts lower than the scores for job satisfaction, and in two 
industries they were 0.2%-pts lower. Thus, it is no wonder that for Poland the relative outcomes (i.e. the dif-
ferences between MNEs and non-MNEs) for job satisfaction and job security turned out to be negatively 
correlated. This was also the case for the Netherlands, where compared with domestic ﬁ  rms job satisfaction 
also scored better for MNEs than job security. In Germany the differences between the scores of MNEs 
and non-MNEs on job satisfaction respectively job security were rather small, though their mutual correla-
tion was only weakly positive.Page ● 64
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3.4.  Working hours compared
We limit ourselves in this comparative chapter to one of the three issues treated under this heading, 
namely the length of the working week. Table 3.9 shows the differences between MNEs and non-MNEs 
by industry and country regarding the percentages of workers usually working over 40 hours per week. The 
data indicates that in a large majority of cases MNEs showed both a larger share of workers usually working 
over 40 hours per week and a longer usual working week. Against both yardsticks there were eight excep-
tions to this rule in 35 cases, though in only two cases (retail in Spain, transport and telecom in Germany) 
did the exceptions coincide. Concerning the share of those working long hours, retail showed most excep-
tions (four), followed by metal and electronics and by transport and telecom. The ﬁ  gure for retail in Poland 
was remarkable, indicating a 16%-points lower share of workers with long hours in MNEs and a working 
week on average 1.1 hour shorter in MNEs. Spanish retail ﬁ  gures were similar.
Table 3.9  Differences between percentages of workers usually working over 40 hours / week (%-points) 
and between average usual working hours/ week (hours) in MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms, by coun-
try and industry
BE FI DE NL PL ES
Metal & electronics
usual working hours > 40  difference MNE-non-MNE 7% 3% 3% 5% 11% -2%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE 2.3 -1.2 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.2
Retail
usual working hours > 40  difference MNE-non-MNE 3% -1% 6% 4% -16% -9%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE 1.5 0.7 1.6 2.7 -1.1 -2.1
Finance & call centres
usual working hours > 40  difference MNE-non-MNE 9% 7% 13% 12% 5% 1%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE 1.7 1.5 2.4 4.0 1.8 -0.3
ICT
usual working hours > 40  difference MNE-non-MNE 5% 2% 9% 7% 3% 9%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE 0.6 0.7 1.6 1.3 1.3 0.6
Transport & telecom
usual working hours > 40  difference MNE-non-MNE 2% 4% -3% 4% 10% -10%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE -0.4 -0.2 -2.1  1.6 0.1 0
Regarding the incidence of long hours, the difference between MNEs and non-MNEs was largest in 
ﬁ  nance and call centres (unweighted average 8.9%-points), followed by the ICT sector (6.6%pts), metal and 
electronics (3.6), and transport and telecom (1.1). Retail showed the reverse outcome, here the incidence of 
long hours was 2.0%-pts more in non-MNEs. Finance and call centres and ICT did not exhibit any country 
exceptions to the ‘larger share of long hours in MNEs’ rule. As for countries, the Netherlands showed the 
largest difference (unweighted average 6.6%-points), followed by Belgium and Germany (both 5.6%-pts), Page ● 65
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while Spain revealed a reverse pattern with a 2.2%-pts larger incidence in domestic ﬁ  rms.
With regard to the average usual working week transport and telecom had the most exceptions (three) 
to the rule that the working week was longer in MNEs. Transport and telecom was also the only indus-
try across the seven countries to show a somewhat shorter working week in MNEs (unweighted average 
0.1% hours less). In the other industries the average working week in MNEs was clearly higher in all seven 
countries, from an average 1.1 hours in ICT to 2.0 hours in ﬁ  nance and call centers. As for countries, the 
Netherlands again was at the top with an average working week 2.1 hours longer in MNEs than in domestic 
ﬁ  rms, followed this time by Belgium and the UK, both with a 1.2 hours’ longer week in MNEs. Again Spain 
showed the reverse picture, with a working week on average 0.4 hours shorter in MNEs.
3.5. Training  compared
Here we limit our comparative treatment of training to the incidence and duration of employer-paid 
or provided training, and leave out the other two issues examined in the detailed reporting, namely: the 
incidence and duration of self-paid training and the importance respondents attached to training. Table 
3.10 shows the differences between incidence (in %-points) and duration (in number of days) of employer-
provided training, in MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms. From the table it clearly emerges that both the incidence 
and the duration of employer-received training were higher in MNEs than in non-MNEs. Belgian transport 
and telecom was the only exception, where the number of training days received was recorded as being a 
tiny bit smaller in MNEs. In all the other 59 cases the advantage was unequivocally with those respondents 
working in MNEs. Moreover, these advantages were substantial, especially concerning the incidence of 
employer-received training.
As for industries, the difference in favour of training received in MNEs was largest in the retail indus-
try (unweighted average 22.0%-points), followed by metal and electronics manufacturing (21%-pts), ICT 
(16.2), transport and telecom (15.5), with ﬁ  nance and call centres (10.5) at the bottom. However, the ranking 
changes if we compare differences in the duration of training. Looked at this way, transport and telecom 
was at the top, with 3.1 more days in MNEs, followed by retail (2.8 days), metal and electronics (2.3), and 
ﬁ  nance and call centers and the ICT industry (both 1.5). Combining both yardsticks, incidence and dura-
tion, the retail sector had the largest ‘MNE advantage’ concerning training. As for countries, Spain took the 
top position, followed by Poland. In Spain, MNEs provided on average (unweighted) 2.7 days more train-
ing for 21.0% more workers than in domestic ﬁ  rms. For Poland these ﬁ  gures were 2.7 days and 19.2%-pts Page ● 66
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respectively. The results for Northwestern European countries were somewhat lower but still signiﬁ  cant in 
terms of the training advantage gained by respondents in MNEs: Germany with 17.8%-pts difference and 
1.6 days more, Belgium with 15.2%-pts and 1.8 days, the UK with 14.6%-pts and (a high score of) 2.6 days, 
and ﬁ  nally the Netherlands with 13.4%-pts and 1.7 days.
Table 3.10  Differences between incidence and duration of employer-received training, in MNE and non-
MNE ﬁ  rms by country and industry
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics





24% - 27% 16% 22% 20% 17%
No of days received from 
employer in last year
difference MNE-
non-MNE
2.3 - 2.1 1.7 3.9 2.2 1.5
Retail





31% - 12% 17% 30% 27% 15%
No of days received from 
employer in last year
difference MNE-
non-MNE
3.6 - 1.3 1.8 1.4 3.6 4.8
Finance & call centres





6% - 5% 10% 12% 16% 14%
No of days received from 
employer in last year
difference MNE-
non-MNE
2.1 - 0.4 1.9 1.2 2.2 1.0
ICT





7% - 23% 13% 12% 27% 15%
No of days received from 
employer in last year
difference MNE-
non-MNE
1.3 - 2.4 2.2 1.5 0.6 0.6
Transport & telecom





8% - 22% 11% 20% 20% 12%
No of days received from 
employer in last year
difference MNE-
non-MNE
-0.1 - 1.9 1.1 5.3 5.0 5.4
3.6.  Industrial relations compared
In this section we report on the three core issues in industrial relations we have analysed, namely, the 
incidence of union membership (union density); the extent of collective bargaining coverage, and the inci-Page ● 67
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dence of workplace employee representation. Table 3.11 shows the differences between respondents’ scores 
on these three issues in MNEs and domestic ﬁ  rms by country and industry. The reader should be aware that 
only the data on union density refer to the seven countries, whereas those on collective bargaining cover 
ﬁ  ve countries (excl. Finland and Poland), and those on employee representation take in six countries (excl. 
Finland). The ﬁ  gures on union density show that in 22 of 35 cases union density was higher in MNEs than 
in domestic ﬁ  rms, in two cases they were on a par and in 11 cases union density was lower in MNEs. These 
last cases were concentrated in transport and telecom, where in ﬁ  ve out of the seven countries density was 
higher in domestic ﬁ  rms, sometimes considerably so; in Belgium, for example, it was 13%-points higher. In 
the ﬁ  nance and call centre industry this was also the case in three countries, in metal and electronics in two 
and in retail in one. In three Belgian industries union density was higher in domestic ﬁ  rms; in Finland, the 
Netherlands and Poland this was the case in two industries, and in the UK in one industry.
Collective bargaining coverage was more marked for workers in MNEs. There were only three excep-
tions to the rule that coverage was higher in MNEs, namely, Dutch metal and electronics and Dutch trans-
port and telecom, and ICT in the UK. This outcome accords with a European Foundation report (2009b, 
9), based on EIRO national centres reports which concluded that in most EU member states collective 
bargaining coverage is higher for MNEs than for domestic ﬁ  rms. Based on our data, the difference in fa-
vour of MNEs was largest in retail (unweighted average 19.8%-points), followed by ﬁ  nance and call centres 
(16.6%-pts), metal and electronics (15.6), ICT (12.6) and transport and telecom (7.0). As for countries, Ger-
many showed the widest difference (unweighted average 23.2%-points), followed by Belgium (20.2), Poland 
(16.0), the UK (6.4), and the Netherlands (5.2). One should note that all these averages hide widely dispersed 
outcomes per country and industry.
Concerning workplace employee representation MNEs showed the largest advantage for workers com-
pared to domestic ﬁ  rms. In 11 cases this advantage was as much as 30%-points. In only two cases, both in 
Poland (transport and telecom and ICT), was employee representation more widespread in domestic ﬁ  rms. 
Looking at our industries, metal and electronics had the largest difference in favour of MNEs (unweighted 
average 28.2%-points), retail ranked second (24.3%-pts), ICT third (24.2), ﬁ  nance and call centres fourth 
(19.8) and transport and telecom (14.2) was last. As for countries, the Netherlands showed the largest aver-
age difference (32.4%-points, unweighted), followed by Germany (32.0), Belgium and Spain both ranking 
third (each 25.2), with the UK (6.4) and Poland (2.2) clearly in the lower ranks.Page ● 68
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Table 3.11  Differences between percentages being member of a trade union covered by a collective agree-
ment, with employee representation, in MNE and non-MNE ﬁ  rms by country and industry
BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics




-1% 3% 7% -1% 1% 1% 8%









33% - 43% 40% 8% 23% 22%
Retail




0% -16% 3% 2% 0% 6% 7%









27% - 31% 32% 4% 37% 15%
Finance & call 
centres




-4% 3% -1% 2% -1% 2% 4%









32% - 11% 30% 11% 20% 15%
ICT




0% 2% 3% 0% 1% 5% 2%









23% - 40% 38% -3% 27% 10%
Transport & telecom




-13% -3% 5% -4% -6% 1% -4%









11% - 35% 22% -9% 19% 7%
Conﬂ  ating the three industrial relations issues, ICT and retail showed the clearest advantages for work-
ers in MNEs compared to domestic ﬁ  rms. Retail had only one negative sign, ICT two, and jointly they had 
the highest averages. Transport and telecom, by contrast, showed the least advantageous picture, with seven 
(of 18) negative cases and the lowest averages. Metal and electronics manufacturing and ﬁ  nance and call 
centres took the middle positions. Over the three issues, Spain was the only country where the differences 
were wholly in favour of MNEs, followed by Germany with just one negative sign. In the Netherlands (four 
of 15 negative cases), Poland (four of 10) and Finland (two of ﬁ  ve), the industrial relations advantages Page ● 69
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for workers in MNEs showed least clearly. In general there does not seem to be a case (anymore) to sug-
gest MNEs in Europe are against unionization though some ﬁ  rms can provide clear exceptions. This held 
true for four industries; the exception was the transport and telecom sector, where the situation in MNEs 
from a workers’ viewpoint turned out to be worse. Most likely the larger average scale of MNE establish-
ments contributes substantially to both the higher collective bargaining coverage and workplace employee 
representation. For employee representation the EU directives dealing with information, consultation and 
participation of workers could be explanatory as well.
3.7.  Working in multinationals and domestic ﬁ  rms compared: 
ﬁ  nal remarks
In our comparison of wage levels in section 3.1, we discussed some factors which explain the wage dif-
ferentials between MNEs and non-MNEs to a limited extent. The sections that followed touched upon a 
number of other differences between MNEs and domestic ﬁ  rms which may further explain the variation in 
labour market position and reputation between the two. Elements that may have explanatory force in this re-
spect may be found in: overtime compensation and practices of (unpaid) overtime; the incidence of internal 
promotion; the incidence of reorganisation and respondents’ expectations in this ﬁ  eld; working hours; the 
incidence and duration of employer-received training, and aspects of industrial relations, in particular union 
density, collective bargaining coverage, and the incidence of workplace employee representation.
If the comparisons of hourly wages may have suggested that ’working in a MNE is good for you’, our 
ﬁ  ndings on (unpaid) overtime and working hours point to the need for a ﬁ  rst qualiﬁ  cation of that view. 
The shares of respondents receiving overtime compensation were, in a substantial majority of the country 
/ industry cases (25 out of 35), lower in MNEs than in domestic ﬁ  rms. By contrast, the practice of working 
overtime appeared to be much more widespread (30 out of 35 cases) in MNEs. As a result, in a majority 
of cases the MNE wage premia that we calculated on an hourly basis would be reduced if calculated on 
weekly/monthly rates, albeit as a rule by less than 1.2%-points. Also, the average usual working week was in 
most cases (27 out of 35) longer in MNEs, as was the percentage of workers usually working over 40 hours 
per week, also in 27 out of 35 cases. It may be true that long(er) working hours are not necessarily perceived 
negatively from a workers’ viewpoint, but against the backdrop of the trends towards reducing working 
hours and growing attention to work-family (or work-life) balance, our outcomes can hardly be evaluated 
positively for MNEs as employers.Page ● 70
M. van Klaveren and K.G. Tijdens
A second group of ﬁ  ndings that gave a less rosy picture of working for MNEs was that concerning 
reported and expected reorganisations. Over-all, reorganisation was more frequently evident in MNEs. In 
23 out of 25 available cases across ﬁ  ve countries, workers in MNEs reported more often than their col-
leagues in domestic ﬁ  rms that ‘their’ organisation had faced a reorganisation in the previous year. Looking 
at expected reorganisation, the evidence (from four instead of ﬁ  ve countries) was unequivocal, with workers 
in MNEs in all 20 cases reporting greater expectation of a reorganisation in the forthcoming 12 months. 
The outcomes for 2007 and the ﬁ  rst half of 2008 may have resulted in comparatively high levels of job 
insecurity perceived in MNEs in the countries under scrutiny. At this point we unfortunately have only 
three-country results at our disposal. The German and Dutch respondents perceived a slightly lower job se-
curity in MNEs than in domestic ﬁ  rms, in particular in retailing, whereas in four out of ﬁ  ve Polish industries 
perceived job security was (much) lower in MNEs. Whereas in the early 2000s job security in for instance 
German MNEs may have been higher than in domestic ﬁ  rms (Cf. Becker and Muendler, 200711), since then 
any ‘MNE advantage’ perceived by workers may have disappeared in view of the many relocations, plant 
closures and mass dismissals which occurred in MNEs all over Europe, and likely also as a result of the ‘exit 
threats’ with which workers in MNEs may have been confronted. 
On other job quality issues, related to the internal organisation of ﬁ  rms, MNEs scored higher than 
domestic ﬁ  rms. First, this was almost universally the case for internal promotion: in 33 out of 35 cases 
the share of those who reported to having been promoted was higher in MNEs than in non-MNEs. As 
already indicated in the industry ﬁ  ndings, the larger scale of MNE establishments may well have favoured 
promotion opportunities, though some outcomes suggest that at least incidentally there was more at stake 
than scale. For example, the share of workers promoted in the current ﬁ  rm was much smaller in Germany 
than in the other countries scrutinized and this applied for both categories of ﬁ  rms, despite the especially 
large scale of the German MNE establishments. The second organizational issue with relatively high MNE 
scores was training. In an overwhelming majority of 59 out of 60 cases, both the incidence and the duration 
of employer-provided training turned out to be higher in MNEs than in domestic ﬁ  rms. The training advan-
tage gained by respondents in MNEs was considerable in all six countries for which we had detailed infor-
mation. Our assumption from Chapter 1 was conﬁ  rmed that skilled workers may be attracted to working in 
an MNE, notably by the prospect of receiving extensive training, which also opens up career opportunities. 
In the course of their careers these workers may derive from this mechanism a stronger wage growth than 
workers in domestic ﬁ  rms, also than those with similar tenure and educational level.
11  Though these authors used a more objective yardstick for job (in)security (the workers separation rate).Page ● 71
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A ﬁ  nal group of issues on which working in MNEs was mostly advantageous could be located in indus-
trial relations. On all three yardsticks used (union density, collective bargaining coverage and the incidence 
of workplace employee representation), MNEs showed higher scores than domestic ﬁ  rms. First, in 22 out 
of 35 country / industry cases union density was higher in MNEs than in domestic ﬁ  rms. Second, the 
MNE advantage was even more marked for collective bargaining coverage, with such coverage higher in 
MNEs in 22 out of 25 cases. And third, in 28 out of 30 cases, workplace employee representation was more 
widespread in MNEs. These results are rather surprising. In 14 out of 25 cases the MNE scores were higher 
on all three yardsticks. Hence, in general there does not seem to be a case (anymore) to suggest MNEs in 
Europe are against unionization though some ﬁ  rms can provide clear exceptions. This held true for four 
industries, most clearly for the retail industry. The exception was the other low-wage industry, transport and 
telecom, where the situation in MNEs from a workers’ viewpoint was least advantageous, with domestic 
ﬁ  rms’ scores higher in seven out of 18 cases and the largest total gap between MNE and domestic ﬁ  rm 
scores. As noted previously, the larger average scale of MNE establishments may contribute to both the 
higher collective bargaining coverage and workplace employee representation, as might the EU directives 
dealing with information, consultation and participation of workers. We may add that the three industrial 
relations yardsticks can also be regarded as aspects of job quality, as higher scores may be linked with more 
and better ‘voice’ for shop-ﬂ  oor workers and better protection against (the worst forms of) unfairness, ar-
bitrariness and uncertainty.
Both from others’ evidence displayed in Chapter 1 and from our own evidence based on the WageIndi-
cator survey and the AIAS MNE database, the picture emerges that the wage advantages emanating from 
working in an MNE in Northwestern Europe recently were rather small – albeit with our evidence suggest-
ing a clear exception for the German case, with signiﬁ  cant MNE wage premia. In the UK the MNE premia 
tended to be substantial, while they were largest in the transition economies Spain and Poland. However, in 
the UK, Spain and Poland low-wage industries were the exceptions -- transport and telecom in the UK and 
retail in both Spain and Poland. We suggested the incidence of outright wage pressure by MNEs in the retail 
trade in Spain, Finland and Poland, and in transport and telecom in again Spain, in Belgium and in the UK.12 
If we broaden our argument, it can be concluded that, besides pay, workers mostly perceive advantages in 
working in an MNE in the ﬁ  elds where these advantages were to be expected from both a labour market 
and an organisational perspective, that is, in (on-the-job) training and internal promotion. It is also in these 
12  For Poland and likely for other CEECs as well, wage pressure of MNEs may, combined with the vulnerability to international 
relocation of parts of their metal and electronics industry, lead to larger wage inequality on top of the already considerable 
wage dispersion. Such factors may constrain the effect of general wage increases in these transition economies.Page ● 72
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closely mutually related ﬁ  elds that MNEs tend to advertise their qualities as good employers, offering ‘attrac-
tive salary packages’ and ‘good promotion prospects’. Apart from the argument that these offers go back to 
well-understood self-interest, the less favourable record of MNEs as a category concerning working hours, 
overtime and (lack of) overtime compensation cannot be overlooked.
Basically, our ﬁ  ndings are an expansion and shading of what, based on earlier WageIndicator data (2004-
2006), Fortanier found for the Netherlands, namely “that working for an MNE is positively associated with 
wages and training, but is also paired with less compensation for overtime, more stress, longer working 
hours and greater perceived gender inequality”13 (2008, 178). It may seem as if MNEs, implicitly or explic-
itly, use an employment model or ‘contract’ in which, in exchange for some additional pay, training facilities 
and career prospects, workers are expected to commit themselves to, if needed, long and partly unpaid 
working hours. We assumed that such a model would exhibit its strongest characteristics in industries with 
relatively high pay and a higher skilled workforce. In order to test this assumption we added up the scores 
for MNEs versus domestic ﬁ  rms on the less favourable issues regarding MNE functioning: overtime and 
overtime compensation, working hours, and experienced and expected reorganisations. We also included the 
scores on work-stress related issues, though for MNEs at large the outcomes on these issues were not nega-
tive. Our assumption was largely conﬁ  rmed. Four of the ﬁ  ve country / industry cases out of 25 that came 
out with the highest scores for MNEs compared to non-MNEs could be found high in the national wage 
hierarchy (Cf. Table 3.1a): German ICT, German ﬁ  nance and call centres; Dutch ﬁ  nance and call centres, 
and Polish metal and electronics manufacturing. The exception, located in a low-wage industry, was Ger-
man transport and telecom. Except for the Dutch ﬁ  nance and call centres industry, these ﬁ  ve cases showed 
up with MNE wage premia of at least 15% if controlled for ﬁ  ve factors (Table 3.2). We may conclude that 
MNE wages, particularly in these ﬁ  ve cases, but more broadly everywhere where considerable MNE wage 
premia pop up, seem to have much in common with the ‘efﬁ  ciency wages’ we referred to in Chapter 1, 
meant to buy higher productivity and extra commitment from (skilled) workers. However, one should be 
aware of the considerable and likely increasing diversity in the ranks of the MNEs. From a workers’ view-
point that sometimes may be valued positively but sometimes negatively as well -- the latter for instance if 
MNEs pursue ‘low road’ ﬁ  rm strategies, including policies of wage pressure, while refraining from ‘quality 
production’ and responsibilities for their incumbent labour force. One should be aware too that the median 
and average ﬁ  gures of the comparisons presented in this chapter mask individual characteristics of particu-
lar MNEs and domestic ﬁ  rms with widely varying behaviour.
13  Equal opportunity in the workplace was not included in our research, as the related question was posed in too few countries.Page ● 73
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